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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two essays with a macroeconomic approach to economic
development. These essays explore specific barriers that prevent economic agents
from exploiting opportunities across regions or sectors in developing countries, and
to what extent the observed allocations are inefficient outcomes or just an efficient
response to economic fundamentals and technological constraints.
The first chapter is motivated by the fact that a prominent feature of cities in
developing countries is the existence of slums: locations with low housing-quality
and informal property rights. This paper focuses on the allocation of land across
slums and formal housing, and emphasizes the role of living in central urban areas for
the formation of slums. I build a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model to
study the aggregate effects of anti-slum policies and use microdata from India for the
quantitative implementation. According to my findings, demolishing slums in central
urban areas leads to a decrease in welfare, aggregate labor productivity, and urban
population. In contrast, decreasing formal housing distortions in India to the U.S.
level increases the urban population share by 20% and labor productivity by 2.4%,
and reduces the share of the urban population living in slums by 19%.
The second chapter is motivated by the fact that labor productivity gaps between
rich and poor countries are much larger for agriculture than for non-agriculture. Using
detailed data from Mexican farms, this paper shows that value added per worker is
frequently over two times larger in cash crops than in staple crops, yet most farmers
choose to produce staples. These findings imply that the agricultural productivity
gap is actually a staple productivity gap and understanding production decisions of
farmers is crucial to explain why labor productivity is so low in poor countries. This
paper develops a general equilibrium framework in which subsistence consumption
and interregional trade costs determine the efficient selection of farmers into types
i
of crops. The quantitative results of the model imply that decreasing trade costs in
Mexico to the U.S. level reduces the ratio of employment in staple to cash crops by
17% and increases agricultural labor productivity by 14%.
ii
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Chapter 1
SLUMS, ALLOCATION OF TALENT, AND
BARRIERS TO URBANIZATION
1.1 Introduction
More than half of the total world population lives in urban regions today. Partic-
ularly, urbanization has increased dramatically in poor countries. In 1960, the urban
population share was 17% and 15% in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, respec-
tively; these shares were 34% and 40% in 2017. A prevalent feature of urban regions
in poor countries is the large population share living in slums: locations characterized
by low-quality housing, lack of public services, and informal property rights. Under-
standing the formation of slums as part of the urbanization process is crucial because
the emergence and growth of cities are closely related to economic development.1
The existence of slums implies a trade-off for policymakers. On one hand, slums
are locations with poorly built houses often occupying valuable land that could oth-
erwise be used for commercial purposes or construction of formal housing.2 On the
other hand, slums are dense areas where dwellers, especially rural migrants, can gain
access to labor market opportunities in urban centers. This trade-off is intensified
by the presence of burdensome regulations that limit the supply of formal housing,
which further raises prices in this sector and increases the demand for and value of
residential space in slums.
The goal of this paper is to measure the aggregate implications of anti-slum poli-
cies in a context of inefficient housing markets. I build a general equilibrium model
1See Kuznets (1968) and Glaeser (2011).
2Henderson et al. (2016) show evidence of the inefficient land-use generated by slums in Nairobi.
1
that features spatial differences in human capital, housing rents, and productivity.
Urban locations offer better economic opportunities in terms of income and returns
to education, but have a higher cost of living than rural regions. Housing rents in
urban locations depend on the supply of residential land, which can be used for pro-
ducing two types of housing: formal or slums. The demand for land is higher in central
urban areas, so the marginal value of land occupied by slums is high; nevertheless,
such slums are formed because workers want to live close to the most productive areas
of the city and formal housing is costly due, in part, to regulations.
The model takes into account the general equilibrium effects of counterfactual
policies through changes in prices and sorting of talent. In particular, housing prices
act as a congestion cost in urban regions due to the limited supply of land, while
selection has two effects: there are potential gains of sorting based on comparative
advantage across locations, but the marginal resident in each location has a relatively
low productivity in that place. Furthermore, the local supply of skills is a function
of returns to education in each location and wages depend on the spatial allocation
of heterogeneous workers.
I focus on the case of India for the empirical motivation and quantitative imple-
mentation of the model. India is widely considered a country with inefficient urban
policies, governments have opted to sanitize cities by demolishing slums in urban ar-
eas where land is most valuable, and its population size (around 1.3 billion) makes
it a particularly important case among developing countries.3 Moreover, Figure 1.1
shows that, in comparison to countries with similar and lower levels of development,
India has a small share of urban population, as well as a low share of the urban
population living in slums. This paper explores the importance of anti-slum policies
3See Bertaud (2002), Brueckner and Sridhar (2012), Bertaud and Brueckner (2005), Diwakar and
Peter (2016), Kumar (2010), Dupont (2008), and Bhan (2009).
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Figure 1.1: Urban and Slum Population in Poor Countries
IND
IND
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Sh
ar
e 
(%
)
625 1,250 2,500 5,000 10,000
GDP per capita (PPP−International $), 2014
Slum share of urban population Urban share of population
Source: UN Habitat, World Development Indicators.
and restrictive building regulations in explaining such facts.
To discipline the model quantitatively, I exploit rich microdata from India. Then,
I use the estimated model to evaluate the aggregate effects of two different policies
that can reduce the slum population: evicting slum dwellers from central urban ar-
eas, which is a common policy in poor countries, and reducing distortions in formal
housing. The quantitative results show that evicting half of the population from cen-
tral slums generates a fall in total output of 1.6% and decreases urban population by
11%. Among individuals evicted from central slums, 76% move to rural regions and
17% move to formal housing in the central urban region. These results imply that
destroying central slums may hinder the urbanization process by pushing people to
rural regions and deterring urban migration.4 Given the high price of formal housing
4In a recent paper, Jedwab and Vollrath (2019) also find that restricting urban migration into
3
in central urban areas, slums are the only option to gain access to the most productive
urban jobs and the periphery is not an attractive alternative.
In contrast, reducing formal housing distortions in India to the U.S level increases
the urban population share by 20% and aggregate labor productivity by 2.4%, and
reduces the share of the urban population living in slums by 19%. Furthermore, I find
that formal housing distortions substantially amplify the negative effects of destroying
central slums, especially in terms of rural-urban migration, by limiting the capacity
of the formal sector to accommodate more population with the available supply of
land. The quantitative results imply that relaxing distortionary regulations is a more
effective policy to increase the urbanization rate and reduce the urban population
living in slums.
This paper is related to a small literature that has considered the economics of
slums and their relationship to economic development.5 In particular, Monge-Naranjo
et al. (2018) document similar findings on economic opportunity gaps between rural
and urban regions in Brazil, including slums. They stress the role of intergenerational
links in explaining the emergence of slums, while this paper focuses on the allocation
of land across types of housing and the importance of living in central urban areas
for the formation of slums. In a related paper, Cavalcanti et al. (2018) examine the
formation of slums in Brazil and analyze the impact of barriers in formal markets.
Their focus is on housing choices within a city, whereas this paper considers the
effects of housing and slums policies on the decision to live in the countryside or one
of multiple urban locations.6 Another difference with these papers is that I study a
informal urban areas reduces welfare by keeping people in rural areas.
5See Marx et al. (2013) for a review of slums in developing countries, and Brueckner and Lall
(2015) for a survey on urbanization and housing in the same class of countries.
6Alves (2018) also looks at the formation of slums in Brazil and stresses the importance of
differences in housing supply elasticity between slums and non-slums in cities.
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country where most people still live in rural areas and barriers to urbanization might
be a key obstacle for development.
This paper also contributes to the literature on India’s urbanization. Munshi and
Rosenzweig (2016) document large wage gaps between urban and rural regions in In-
dia, and argue that caste-based insurance networks act as a barrier to rural-urban mi-
gration.7 I document evidence on wage differences between slums and formal housing
in urban regions, and focus on housing regulations as possible barriers to urbaniza-
tion in India. Additionally, this paper relates to the large macroeconomics literature
on urban-rural development. Specifically, Gollin et al. (2014) and Herrendorf and
Schoellman (2018) look at human capital gaps as a possible explanation for the large
productivity gaps between non-agriculture and agriculture. I build on their ideas to
measure spatial differences in human capital across locations.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on quantitative spatial economics. I
build on the framework of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Bryan and Morten (2018), who
draw on results from Eaton and Kortum (2002) to characterize the allocation of work-
ers across locations as gravity equations that depend on congestion and agglomeration
forces.8 In a recent paper, Gechter and Tsivanidis (2017) use a quantitative general
equilibrium model to assess the impact of land redevelopment based on a natural
experiment in Mumbai, taking into account the effects on slums. This paper focuses
on the aggregate effects of restrictive building regulations and anti-slum policies in
India, taking into consideration differences in labor market opportunities between
urban and rural regions.9
7Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2014) find that urban-rural wage gaps in India have decreased due to
urban sprawl (rural areas reclassified as urban), and urban migration accounts for only a small
fraction of the decline.
8Similar frameworks include Monte et al. (2018) and Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2017).
9In a related paper, Hsieh and Moretti (2018) show that housing constraints are important for
5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the main
data used in the paper and empirical evidence from India. Section 1.3 describes
policies related to housing development and slums in this country. Next, Section 2.3
introduces a spatial model of talent allocation that is consistent with the trade-offs
motivated by the empirical evidence. Then, Section 1.5 provides a description of the
estimation and presents the quantitative results of counterfactual policies. Section 1.6
considers extensions and robustness checks, and Section 2.5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section I document empirical evidence from India. I use survey data to
present facts of rural and urban regions, splitting the latter into formal locations
and slums. The data come from the India Human Development Survey-II, 2011-2012
(IHDS II). This is a nationally representative survey of 42,152 households in 1,420
villages and 1,042 urban neighborhoods. The information in these surveys includes
individual data on education, labor income, and hours worked; as well as household
data on expenditures and dwelling characteristics. These data have the advantage of
allowing me to identify slums in urban regions and use a rich set of individual infor-
mation to compare relevant outcomes that characterize the main trade-offs between
rural and urban areas.
The classification of households as urban or rural in IHDS II is based on the Census
of India 2011. According to the latter, urban areas are towns where local government
bodies are situated, and places with: (i) a minimum population of 5,000; (ii) at least
75% of male working population engaged in non-agricultural activities; and (iii) a
population density of at least 400 persons per sq.km. Therefore, urban regions include
administrative centers of local governments, such as municipal corporations, and areas
the spatial allocation of labor and aggregate labor productivity in the US.
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with a high population density where non-agricultural activities predominate. Rural
villages are areas that do not satisfy the previous definition. In 2011, urban population
in India represented 31% of total population.
I use IHDS II data to identify slums based on the definition of the United Nations
(UN).10 I define slums as urban households that: (i) do not have access to piped
water or protected source; (ii) do not have a private toilet or dispose waste in open
fields; (iii) have roof/walls made of thatch, mud or grass; or (iv) do not have proof
of residence such as an electric bill or rent agreement.11 Formal urban houses are
dwellings located in urban areas that are not classified as slums. Adapting the UN
definition to the available data is a standard practice in papers about slums or informal
urban settlements. Note that slums are defined at the household level and this type
of dwellings tend to be clustered in neighborhoods within a city.
1.2.1 Education and Labor Income
In this section I document economic opportunity gaps across location types: rural,
slums, and formal urban housing. The evidence presented has two patterns: individ-
uals living in slums have lower outcomes in terms education and labor income within
urban regions, but they are more educated and have higher income than those in
rural regions.
First, Figure 1.2 shows differences in educational attainment for men that are
10An urban household lives in a slum if it lacks at least one of the following: improved source of
water, improved sanitation facilities, housing durability, tenure security, or sufficient living area.
11IHDS II do not provide good data to measure sufficient living space. Using this definition, I
obtain a share of slums population in urban regions equal to 36%. This share is higher than the
one observed in the closest year to the surveys in UN data: 29% in 2009. If I do not take into
account tenure security, I obtain a similar share to the UN; however, the empirical evidence is not
very sensitive to this distinction and the lack of property rights is a key feature of slums.
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Figure 1.2: Educational attainment across locations
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Notes: Shares of male population 25 years or older. Source: Author estimates using IHDS II 2012.
25 years or older. I make this sample restriction to focus on individuals who have
likely finished their education. The results show that attainment is higher in both
types of urban locations. The share of individuals with at least primary school is 11
percentage points higher in slums than rural regions, and 24 percentage points higher
in formal urban areas. Similarly, the share of individuals with at least secondary
school is higher in slums than in rural regions, although the difference is smaller in
this case. These results show that educational gaps between individuals living in
slums and those living in formal urban housing are especially large for higher levels
of education, which is consistent with the notion that low-skilled individuals tend to
live in slums.
Another key difference between rural and urban regions are labor market out-
comes. Table 1.1 presents the gaps in hourly wages between urban locations and
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Table 1.1: Hourly Wage Relative to Rural Regions
Raw Gap Adjusted Gap for Education
Slum 1.41 1.32
Formal urban 1.79 1.51
Observations 34,337 34,299
Notes: Based on working age male population (15-65 years). Controlling for age in both cases.
Source: Author estimates using IHDS II 2012.
rural regions for working age (15-65 years) men who worked at least part time. These
gaps are obtained by running a regression of individual log-wages on location type,
choosing rural areas as the omitted group. The gaps reported are equal to exp(β`),
where β` is the regression coefficient of each location type. The raw wage gap be-
tween slums and rural regions is equal to 1.4, which means that hourly wages are
40% higher in slums than in rural regions, while the raw gap between formal urban
areas and rural regions is equal to 1.8. These large wage gaps are usually interpreted
as suggestive evidence of barriers to labor mobility, or as a reflection of skill sorting
across locations. To account for selection of skilled individuals, I estimate the wage
gaps controlling for educational attainment. The adjusted gaps are smaller but still
large and, while there can be selection based on unobservable human capital, they
suggest that there are barriers preventing individuals from exploiting opportunities
across space.
Next, I relate the findings on education levels and wages by exploiting the micro
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data to compare returns to education by location type. To do so, I estimate the
following log-wage regression:
log(Wi`) = β`D` + ηjei + αf(expi`) + i`. (1.1)
Where Wi` is the hourly wage of individual i living in location `, D` is a location
dummy, f(expi) is a quartic in experience at the place of residence, ei are education
years completed by individual i, and i` is an i.i.d. error with zero mean. In the same
spirit as Lagakos et al. (2018b), I define potential experience as expi` = min{age −
ei − 6, age − 16, years living in `}.12 This definition implies that individuals start
working in their current location at age 16, when they finish school, or when they
move to this place, whichever comes last. The results presented in Table 1.2 show that
returns to education are higher in urban regions, especially in formal urban areas.
Thus, not only are wages higher in urban regions for a given level of education, but
individuals with high educational attainment gain more from working in cities. One
interpretation of these results is that occupations in cities are more skill-intensive in
comparison to those in rural areas.13
The evidence on education levels and labor income implies that, despite the unhy-
gienic conditions and lack of basic public services, slums tend to have residents with
a higher level of education than those in rural regions, and they give access to labor
markets with higher returns. That said, these results also stress that outcomes are
worse in slums within urban regions. One of the reasons previous papers have argued
that slums have characteristics of poverty traps is due to the fact that human capital
is low in those places. Having access to formal housing is crucial to fully exploit labor
market opportunities in urban regions and, as explained below, regulations limiting
the supply of formal housing might be keeping too many people living in slums in
12The results are very similar if I use total experience instead of experience at the place of residence.
13Young (2013) formalizes this argument to explain urban-rural wage gaps.
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Table 1.2: Returns to Education by Location
Location Mincer return
Rural 4.3%
Slum 5.1%
Formal urban 6.5%
Observations 34,074
Notes: Based on working age male population (15-65 years). Source: Author estimates using IHDS II 2012.
India.
1.2.2 Housing Rents
The previous section focused on the benefits of urban regions. However, living in
cities generally increases the costs of living for rural migrants; in particular, housing
costs are higher in urban regions. Based on reports from National Sample Surveys
(NSS) in India - Housing Conditions Round 58th in 2002, Table 1.3 presents the gaps
in monthly house rents for different levels of floor area.14 According to these data,
the average monthly rent in slums is 1.2 times higher than in rural regions, while
the average monthly rent of a formal urban house is 2.4 times higher than in the
countryside. Furthermore, monthly rents are higher in urban locations for every level
14Compared with more recent rounds of National Sample Surveys, round 58th reports monthly
rents of slums/squatters in urban regions. In these surveys, 92% of rural households and 60%
of urban households reported owning their house, so the rents reported include imputed rents to
non-rental households.
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Table 1.3: Monthly House Rent Relative to Rural Regions
Floor area (sq.m.)
Location 20-30 30-40 40-50 75-100 All
Slum 1.6 1.3 1.9 1.5 1.2
Formal urban 2.0 2.1 2.4 4.2 2.4
Source: National Sample Survey 58th Round, 2002. Housing Condition in India.
of floor area. In comparison to the average dwelling in rural regions, which has a
floor area of 30 to 40 sq.m., housing rents are 30% higher in slums and more than two
times higher in formal urban areas. These housing rent gaps are larger for middle
size dwellings and extremely large for big houses. The average floor area in slums is
almost half of the average floor area of a dwelling in both rural regions and formal
urban areas, which explains the smaller size of the average rent gap compared to the
gaps conditional on floor area.
I use data from NSS to compare housing rents because these surveys were made
with the goal of comparing housing conditions in India, and the estimates of monthly
rents include imputed rents on non-rental households based on similar dwellings in
a given locality. That said, using data from IHDS II and focusing on rental house-
holds that report positive rents, I find similar results for the gap in average monthly
rent between formal urban areas and rural regions, 2.4, and a moderately larger gap
between slums and rural regions, 1.9.15
15In IHDS II data, 99% of rural households reported owning their house, as opposed to renting or
being an accommodation provided by an employer. This share is equal to 84% in urban regions.
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A possible concern is that many slum dwellers in India do not have tenure security,
which is evident from the common forced evictions. The latter means that payments
of rents are not necessarily enforced through legal rental agreements. If many slums
dwellers are occupying land illegally, then their relevant housing cost might not only
be the payments done in the informal rental market, but also other types of protec-
tion payments. Overall, the evidence shows that housing costs are higher in urban
regions, even in slums. Thus, individuals face a trade-off between better labor market
opportunities and higher costs of living in cities.
1.3 Urban Policies in India
This section provides a description of urban policies in India. This country is
considered a notable case of inefficient urban regulations. Examples of such poli-
cies include building-height limits which restrict the available floor space per capita;
rent controls that keep the rental market underdeveloped; urban land ceilings which
constrain the holdings of land in the private sector; and regulations that restrict
the ability to transfer property. These regulations limit the supply of formal urban
housing in India and raise the price of houses.
A common policy to control density growth in cities by restricting building heights
are legal limits to the floor area ratio (FAR). The FAR is defined as the total area
of floor space contained in a building divided by the area of its lot. According to
a study from the World Bank in 2013, the FAR in the main cities of India is very
low by international standards. For example, Delhi and Mumbai have a FAR of
approximately 1.3 in the city center; by contrast, San Francisco and New York have a
FAR of 9 and 15, respectively. These limits are not equal to the total number of floors
that a building can have. For example, buildings can cover only a section of their
lot, while the remaining lot area is used for open spaces or plazas. However, a low
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FAR constrains the supply of urban formal housing and the capacity to accommodate
population with the available supply of land.
In addition, approval processes to build new houses are lengthy and costly in India.
According to 2018 data from the Word Bank Doing Business reports, construction
permits necessary to build a warehouse cost 23% of the value of the building. The
latter compares with 8% in China, 10% in South Africa, and 1% in the United States.16
A study from KPMG in 2014 shows that the approval process for housing development
in India takes between two and three years and increases construction costs by 20 to
30 per cent. These regulations increase the incentives to build high-value real estate
to cover approvals costs, instead of affordable housing. Furthermore, taxes and fees
in India account for 30 to 35 per cent of housing development cost. This means that
approvals costs and regulation fees together account for more than 50% of housing
construction costs. As a comparison, in the US government regulations at different
levels account for 24% of the final price of a new house according to Emrath (2016).
With respect to slums, governments in India have carried on massive forced de-
molitions in recent decades. For example, between 2004 and 2005, at least 90,000
slums houses were demolished in Mumbai, which represented around 8% of the slum
population in the city; similarly, not less than 45,000 slums houses were demolished
in Delhi from 2004 to 2007. Governments have tried to recover valuable land occu-
pied by slums in the main cities of the country, and a significant amount of slums
located in central urban areas have been demolished. In most cases, only a small
fraction of evicted dwellers are offered subsidized relocation, mainly to peripheral
areas of the city: 20 to 40 kilometers from the original location.17 To put this into
16These costs include fees associated with obtaining land use approvals, construction inspections,
utility connections, and registration of the warehouse.
17See Bhan (2009), Kumar (2010), Dupont (2008) and Diwakar and Peter (2016).
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Figure 1.3: Share of Population Living in Slums in Mumbai (%)
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of the biggest slums in the world.
Source: Development Plan for Greater Mumbai 2014-2034. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.
context, according to the 2011 Census, 78% of urban commuters in India work within
10 kilometers from their home. In Mumbai, the average one-way commute is just 5.3
kilometers for all workers and 3.9 kilometers for the poor (Baker et al. (2005)).
Therefore, it is not surprising that slums dwellers displaced to outskirts of the
cities tend to lose their livelihoods. A study from slums evictions and resettlements
in the city of Chennai revealed that 80% of evicted dwellers lost their employment
after being relocated. The forced eviction of slum dwellers in central urban areas fails
to recognize that such slums are formed because households want to live close to the
most productive areas of the city. To see this, Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of
slum population across Mumbai subdistricts. Slums are located in almost every area
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of the city and, in particular, they are located close to the business districts in the
center and south of the city. In fact, one of the biggest slums in the world, Dharavi,
is located just 5 kilometers away from the main Central Business District (CBD) of
Mumbai. This case exemplifies the fact that slums occupy valuable land in the most
attractive urban locations, which partially explains the incentives of governments to
evict their dwellers and allocate that land to the formal sector.
1.4 Model
This section introduces a static general equilibrium model with spatial sorting.
There is a mass one of individuals in the economy and three regions indexed by
x ∈ {c, p, r}: urban center (c), urban periphery (p), and rural (r). Each urban region
is divided in two types of neighborhoods: slums (s) and formal urban (f). To simplify
the notation, I will use ` ∈ {cf, cs, pf, ps, r} to denote the five possible residential
locations. There are no trade costs and individuals can freely choose their place of
residence. Location characteristics, such as productivity and amenities, are exogenous
in the model. Section 1.6.3 relaxes this assumption and considers the quantitative
implications of introducing endogenous agglomeration forces.
The model builds on the quantitative spatial framework of Bryan and Morten
(2018), which itself relates to Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), Monte et al. (2018), and Hsieh
et al. (2018). The model also adapts ideas from the macro-development literature on
sectoral productivity gaps and human capital, particularly Gollin et al. (2014) and
Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018).
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1.4.1 Preferences and Individual Problem
Every individual i living in location ` has preferences over consumption ci` and
housing hi` given by
Ui` =
(
ci`
1− α
)1−α (
hi`
α
)α
µ`, (1.2)
where α is the expenditure share on housing and µ` denotes amenities in location
`. The value of these amenities is exogenous and governs the compensating wage
differentials across locations. Individuals living in location ` maximize utility by
choosing consumption and housing subject to their budget constraint: ci` + r`hi` =
Wi`, where the consumption good has been used as the numeraire; r` is the rental
price of housing in location `; and Wi` denotes labor earnings of individual i in
location `. Individuals know the labor income they would have in each location and
choose where to live by comparing welfare across places. As described below, this
comparison depends on characteristics that make locations more or less attractive,
namely housing rents, amenities, and income, which in turn depends on individual
comparative advantage.
1.4.2 Human Capital and Labor Income
Labor income is a function of human capital, which depends on individual talent
and education. To be specific, I build on the macro-development literature and define
individual human capital (efficiency units) as
zi` = νi` exp(ei η`), (1.3)
where ei ∈ {0, 1, ..., 16} are education years of individual i, which are valued at rate η`
in location `. Parameter η` governs the elasticity between education years and human
capital, and captures differences in the demand for skilled labor in each location. I
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assume that individual education and schooling returns are exogenous. The share
of individuals in the economy with e years of education completed is denoted by ζe.
Additionally, every individual is endowed with an idiosyncratic talent draw νi` for
each possible residential location. The idea is that individuals have different talents
and the type of jobs in each location may be different. Most individuals in rural
regions work in agriculture and slums dwellers tend to concentrate in elementary
occupations such as rag-picking or low-value manufacturing; similarly, industries in
the urban periphery are not the same as those in the main business areas of a city.
For example, banking and financial services tend to be located in the CBD of a city.
I follow Bryan and Morten (2018) and assume that talent is drawn from a multi-
variate Fre´chet distribution
F (νcf , ..., νr) = exp
(
−
[∑
`
ν
− θ˜
1−ρ
`
]1−ρ )
, (1.4)
where the shape parameter θ˜ > 0 governs the dispersion of talent draws. A higher
value of θ˜ implies lower variation in individual talent. Parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1) governs
the correlation of skills between locations.18 As ρ get close to one, the distribution
approaches the case of unidimensional talent. To characterize the rest of the model it
is useful to define a shape parameter adjusted for the correlation between productivity
draws: θ = θ˜/(1− ρ). The importance of sorting in the model is stronger when there
is high variation in individual talent or when there is a low correlation in talent across
locations.
18This is a Gumbel Copula distribution. Its main advantage over other distributions is that it leads
to tractable analytical solutions of the model. About the marginal Fre´chet, Lagakos and Waugh
(2013) argue that the talent draw in location ` can be thought as the task or occupation, among
a large set of options, that maximizes individual labor income in that place. To the extent that
the number and types of industries to which an individual has access are different across locations,
individuals have a different draw in each place.
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Individuals are endowed with one unit of time to supply inelastically in the labor
market they face at their place of residence. There is no commuting across locations,
even within the city. This is a simplifying assumption based on the observation that
commuting distances are extremely short in India.19 Then, individual labor earnings
in each location are defined as
Wi` = ω` zi`, (1.5)
where ω` is the wage per efficiency unit in location `.
1.4.3 Production Technologies
There is a final consumption good supplied by competitive producers in urban
and rural regions and traded without costs, but regions differ in the technology they
use. In urban regions, the final good is produced using efficiency units of labor from
every urban location according to
Yu =
[∑
`6=r
(
A`Z`
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (1.6)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution across locations and Z` is the demand for
efficiency units of labor from urban location `. In practice, I will focus on finite values
of σ greater than one, which implies that labor units from different urban locations
are not perfect substitutes but also that none of them is essential. Note that the
specification in (6) implies that each urban location produces an intermediate good
given by Y` = A`Z`. Labor productivity is potentially different in each location and
19In Section 1.6.1 I relax this assumption to assess the quantitative importance of allowing com-
muting from the urban periphery to the center. The baseline model captures access to commuting
in a reduced form way through differences in local productivity.
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A` is a parameter that captures spatial differences in industry mix, infrastructure,
agglomeration forces, and access to non-tradable goods. The aggregation of labor to
produce the final good in the city is the link across urban locations in the model, and
the implicit assumption is that each location produces a differentiated good consumed
by individuals in every place of the city. On the other hand, the final good in the
rural region is produced using local labor according to
Yr = Ar Zr, (1.7)
where Ar is a parameter of rural labor productivity.
1.4.4 Housing Production and Land
The available supply of land varies across space. First, I assume there is an infinite
supply of land in rural regions and housing supply is perfectly elastic (i.e. there is no
land congestion). Therefore, rural housing prices are constant: rr ≡ Cr. Parameter Cr
captures the marginal cost of producing a unit of housing in the rural region. Second,
in each urban region, the amount of residential land is fixed, denoted by Lx, and
owned by landlords who only consume goods in their location.20 Moreover, a fraction
of land φx is occupied by slums in each urban region, for which landlords do not receive
any payment. This means that 1 − φx is the fraction of land available for formal
development. This fraction is exogenous and captures the results of government
policies and enforcement choices towards slums.
In both urban regions, formal housing is produced using land L` and intermediate
inputs M` (same as consumption good) according to Hxf = (Lxf )
ψ (Mxf )
1−ψ, where
ψ ∈ (0, 1) governs the intensity of land in housing production. Formal developers
20As noted by Monte et al. (2018), this type of assumption allows the incorporation of general
equilibrium effects from changes in the value of land, without introducing an externality in the
location choice of individuals from the redistribution of local land rents.
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maximize profits taking housing rental prices r` and residential land prices px as
given, that is,
max
Mxf ,Lxf
(1− τ) rxf (Lxf )ψ(Mxf )1−ψ − Mxf − pxLxf , (1.8)
where τ > 0 is a distortion that developers take as given and captures regulations
such as FAR limits, rent controls, and approval costs. The fraction of housing output
that is “taxed”, τ rxfHxf , is thrown away. In equilibrium, the demand for land by
formal developers has to be equal to the available supply: (1− φx)Lx. On the other
hand, housing production in slums is given by
Hxs = Cs φx Lx, (1.9)
where Cs is a technology parameter that governs the density of housing production
in slums. The difference in housing technologies is meant to reflect the fact that
production of housing in slums is more intensive in the use of land and a fixed amount
of housing space can be constructed per unit of land: dwellings in slums are usually
homogeneous, small one-story houses with one or two rooms at most. In comparison,
the formal housing sector has the possibility to substitute intermediate inputs for
land and produce different amounts of housing space per unit of land (e.g. houses or
apartment buildings). Note that the supply of housing in slums is fixed in each urban
region, but housing demand is determined endogenously. In equilibrium, the housing
rent of slums has to clear the housing market in these locations. This rent is paid by
individuals to owners who only consume goods in their location.
1.4.5 Equilibrium
I now provide a description of allocations and prices in general equilibrium. First,
indirect utility of individuals with e years of education and νi` units of talent in
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location ` is
Vi`|e = µx νi` ω` exp(e η`) r −α` . (1.10)
Given the distribution of individual talent and expression (10) for every location, it
can be shown that the share of individuals living in location j conditional on having
e years of education is
pij|e =
(
ωj exp(e ηj) µj r
−α
j
)θ∑
`
(
ω` exp(e η`) µ` r
−α
`
)θ . (1.11)
Equation (11) says that the spatial allocation of talent depends on relative housing
costs, local productivity, returns to education, and amenities. Housing prices act as
congestion cost in each urban location due to the limited supply of land; moreover,
formal housing prices in urban regions are relatively high due to regulation distortions.
On the other hand, individuals are attracted to more productive locations and to
places with a higher value of amenities. Locations with higher returns to education,
where jobs use skills more intensively, attract individuals with more years of education
because the function exp(eη`) implies complementarity between e and η`. This means
that the gain from living in a location with higher returns to schooling is larger for
a person with more years of education. In equilibrium, the share of individuals who
choose to live in location ` is given by pi` =
∑16
e=0 pik|e ζe, and market clearing implies∑
` pi`=1.
Additionally, the supply of housing must be equal to the demand in every location,
that is,
H` = α
I`
r`
(1.12)
where I` =
∑16
e=0
[ ∫
i∈Ω`|e ω` zi`(e) dFi
]
ζe is total labor income in location ` and Ω`|e
denotes the set of individuals with e years of education who choose to live in location
`. Furthermore, the price of land in each urban region has to clear the market of
land, thus,
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px = ψ
(1− τ)rxfHxf
(1− φx) Lx
. (1.13)
This expression implies that, holding all else constant, the price of land increases
with the amount of land occupied by slums because the amount available for formal
development is smaller. Also, attractive locations have a higher demand for housing,
which raises the value of land in those places. To see how distortions affect the supply
of formal urban housing it is useful to focus on the optimal supply of housing per
unit of land: hxf = Hxf/Lxf . In this case, the density of housing production in the
formal sector is given by
hxf =
[
(1− τ) (1− ψ) rxf
] (1−ψ)
ψ . (1.14)
Then, a higher value of τ implies that a lower amount of formal housing can be
developed with the available supply of land.
In equilibrium, labor demand in each location must equal labor supply: Z` =∑16
e=0
[ ∫
i∈Ω`|e zi`(e) dFi
]
ζe; and workers are paid a wage per efficiency unit of labor,
ωr = AR and ω` =
(
A`
)σ−1
σ
(
Yu
Z`
)1/σ
, ` 6= r. (1.15)
Labor demand in a particular urban location has a negative slope and increases with
local productivity A`. Note that ω`, for ` 6= r, depends on labor demand and local
productivity of every urban location through Yu. The model implies that the gap in
average wages between location ` and j, conditional on education years, is given by
W `|e
/
W j|e =
ω`
ωj
exp(e η`)
exp(e ηj)
(
pi`|e
pij|e
)− 1
θ
. (1.16)
According to expression (16), conditional wage gaps between location pairs reflect
differences in local productivity captured by ω`; differences in returns to education
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given by η`; and the sorting effect captured by conditional population shares pi`|e.
The sorting effect refers to the fact that there is a negative relationship between
average wage and population share in a given location because the marginal worker
has a relatively low productivity in that place. That is, as population increases in a
particular location, new dwellers are added from the lower part of the distribution of
talent. The strength of the sorting effect on wages depends on the variation of talent
draws within locations and the correlation of draws across locations: θ = θ˜/(1− ρ).21
When the correlation is high, the sorting effect is weaker since individuals tend to
have similar levels of talent in every location. Finally, the unconditional wage gap
between locations pairs can be written as
W `
/
W j =
ω`
ωj
∑16
e=0 exp(e η`)pi
1−1/θ
`|e ζe∑16
e=0 exp(e ηj)pi
1−1/θ
j|e ζe
pij|e
pi`|e
. (1.17)
Thus, differences in average labor earnings depend on the level of education in each
place, which is captured by the term ζepi`|e. Education returns in the model have a
similar role in explaining wage gaps and spatial sorting as differences in skill intensities
in Young (2013), given that a higher return in location ` attracts more educated
individuals to that place; moreover, selection is key to explain wage gaps across
locations in the model, though, similar to the argument in Bryan and Morten (2018),
amenities and housing prices (regulations) introduce possible frictions to the spatial
allocation of labor.
21This implies that absolute and comparative advantage are aligned in the model. See Young
(2014).
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1.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents the estimation of the model using the IHDS II and other
sources of aggregate data from India. The main parts of the estimation can be
summarized as follows. First, I estimate a subset of parameters using informative
relationships derived from the model. Then, I implement an internal method of
moments to recover unobserved location characteristics using data on wages, housing
rents, and population shares. Finally, I validate the model by comparing non-targeted
moments in the model and the data. I then use the estimated model to compare the
effects of evicting slum dwellers from central urban areas and reallocating the land to
the formal sector with the effects of reducing formal housing distortions. I focus on
changes in the share of urban population, total output (which in this case is the same
as output per capita), and individual welfare computed by aggregating equation (10).
To provide intuition, I also quantify the effects of these policies on different population
groups.
1.5.1 Calibration
First, productivity in the rural region Ar is normalized to one. Next, I restrict
amenities in urban regions by assuming they have the same value in both neighbor-
hood types within each urban region, i.e, µxf = µxs. The idea is that amenities are
a key difference between urban and rural regions: access to urban services versus
exposure to pollution and loss of rural networks. Differences between slums and for-
mal urban areas are captured by local productivity, education returns, and housing
technologies. Since the value of amenities governs compensating wage differentials, I
normalize central urban amenities by setting µc equal to one. I follow Allen and Arko-
lakis (2014) and choose σ equal to 9. This value implies a high level of substitutability
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between urban locations.22 Given that the model assumes a distorted housing market
in India, I take the U.S. as an efficient benchmark to determine the value of housing
expenditure share and the intensity of land in housing construction. I set α equal to
0.25 following Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011), and ψ equal to 0.15 based on Epple
et al. (2010). I determine the value of distortions in the formal housing sector τ
using a report from KPMG (2014) on housing development in India, according to
which taxes, fees and approval costs account for approximately 55% of the housing
development costs. I take this as a measure of distortions in formal housing.
To obtain the supply of residential land in each urban region, I focus on the case
of Mumbai. I use information from the Development Plan for Greater Mumbai 2014 -
2034 (DPGM) to obtain the amount of residential land in each subdistrict of the city.
Then, I define the urban periphery as those subdistricts that are in the outskirts of
the city: 20 or more kilometers away from the closest CBD.23 This cutoff is consistent
with the location of resettlements offered to evicted slums dwellers in the main cities
of India.24 Based on these definitions, I set Lp/Lc equal to 0.43. This ratio shows
that the periphery is a smaller area than the central region of the city; however, the
price of land in the model will reflect the fact that most individuals want to live in
the center. Additionally, based on information from the DPGM, I set φx equal to
0.33 for both urban regions, which is the share of land occupied by slums in both the
center and periphery of Mumbai.
Lastly, I calculate the population share with e years of education ζe using data
from the IHDS II. In this case I restrict the sample to focus on working age male
individuals who have potentially finished their education (between 25 and 65 years
22Section 1.6.4 presents robustness checks with lower elasticity values.
23This is based on subdistricts that are part of Mumbai City and Suburban Mumbai. A map is
included in Appendix A.
24See Dupont (2008) and Diwakar and Peter (2016).
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old). Individuals are assigned to one of 17 possible categories that go from zero years
of schooling to graduate education (above bachelors degree or more than 15 years
of education). The five highest shares are the following: ζ0 = 22.1%, ζ10 = 12.3%,
ζ9 = 9.5%, ζ8 = 8.3%, and ζ12 = 8.1%.
Returns to Education
The model implies a relationship between log-wages and education years similar to a
Mincer regression:
log(Wi`) = log(ω`) + η` ei + log(νi`) (1.18)
Based on this expression, I use data from IHDS II to estimate location-specific returns
to education η` in the same way as Section 1.2.1, but in this case I distinguish between
central and peripheral urban regions. IHDS II does not provide the geographical
location of households within cities; however, for rural villages, it reports the distance
to the main city in the district. I use this information to define the urban periphery as
those villages that are between zero and nine kilometers from the main urban center
of their district. This cutoff is determined by the relationship between average wages
and distance. Villages within nine kilometers of the urban center have an average
wage that is much higher than the rest of the rural areas: around 33% higher. The
assumption is that villages located close to main cities have similar characteristics to
urban locations in the periphery of the city.
Given this definition of urban periphery and following expression (18), I estimate
a Mincer regression of log-wages on education years. To do so, I control for location
fixed effects to account for local differences in productivity, and a quartic in experi-
ence at the place of residence to account for individual comparative advantage. The
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Table 1.4: Location-specific Mincer Returns
Location Mincer return (η`)
Formal center 6.5%
Slum center 5.1%
Formal periphery 6.3%
Slum periphery 4.4%
Rural 4.2%
Notes: Based on male population (15-65 years).
Source: Author estimates using IHDS II 2012.
Mincer return for each location type η` is reported in Table 1.4. These results show
that returns to education are significantly higher in urban regions; in particular, re-
turns are high for individuals living in formal housing even if they are located in the
periphery. On the other hand, peripheral slums have similar education returns to
rural regions, but returns are higher in central slums and, thus, they attract more
educated individuals to live in such locations.
These estimates suggest important differences in the use or value of skills across
locations. However, as noted by Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018), differences in
location-specific returns to education could be partially capturing selection. That
is, urban returns to education could be higher than rural because individuals with
high cognitive talent live in cities. To address this possibility, Section 1.6.4 presents
a robustness check of the results taking into account this bias. That said, the fact
that education has a higher value in urban occupations does not mean that moving to
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the city necessarily generates large productivity gains, because selection partly offsets
those gains in the model, though not through returns to schooling. If most individuals
with a strong comparative advantage for urban occupations already live in the city,
then productivity gains from increasing urban migration would be relatively small.
Distribution of Talent Parameters
To estimate the parameters that govern the distribution of talent across locations, I
use the relationship implied by the model between average wage by location and the
share of population living in that location conditional on education years:
log
(
W `|e
exp(η` e)
)
= log(ω`) − 1
θ
log(pi`|e). (1.19)
First, using data from IHDS II, I compute average wages for each location-education
pair, as well as the corresponding population share. There are a total of 84 observa-
tions based on ` ∈ {cf, cs, pf, ps, r} locations and e ∈ {0, 1, ..., 16} education years.
Then, following expression (19) and using the Mincer returns estimated in the pre-
vious section, I estimate the elasticity between conditional average wages divided by
the value of education in human capital and conditional population shares, control-
ling for location type. The model implies that this conditional elasticity is a measure
of spatial sorting: 1/θ. The estimated value of θ is 4.13. Next, properties of the
Fre´chet distribution imply that the squared coefficient of variation of location wages
conditional on education is equal to: Γ
(
1− 2
θ(1−ρ)
)/
Γ
(
1− 1
θ(1−ρ)
)2
− 1. I calculate
this moment for all the location-education pairs in the data and use the estimate of θ
to find the value of ρ that fits the data. I obtain a value ρ equal to 0.29, which is the
Kendall rank coefficient and represents a moderately high correlation across talent
draws. The linear correlation is equal to 0.58. These estimates imply that the value
of the shape parameter θ˜ = θ(1 − ρ) is equal to 2.92. The estimated value of this
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parameter, which governs the variation in productivity draws, is in the same range
of other papers that use similar parameterizations in other contexts. For example,
Bryan and Morten (2018) estimate values equal to 2.69 and 3.18 across regions in the
U.S. and Indonesia, respectively; and Hsieh et al. (2018) find values close to 2 across
occupation in the U.S.25
Internal Calibration
There are eight remaining parameters: Acf , Acs, Apf , Aps, Cs, Cr, µp, and µr. These
parameters are calibrated jointly to match eight moments: (i-iv) population shares
by location; (v) the housing rent gap between urban and rural, (vi) the housing
rent gap between formal urban and slums, (vii) the wage gap between urban and
rural, and (viii) the wage gap between center and periphery. Population shares in the
periphery are obtained from the DPGM based on subdistricts located in the periphery
of Mumbai, as described in Section 1.5.1; and differences in housing rents are obtained
from the reports of the NSS - Housing Conditions Round 58th in 2002. The latter
takes into account imputed housing rents of non-rental households based on prevailing
rents of similar dwellings in a given locality. Housing rents in the data represent both
the price and quantity of housing space consumed by households. To deal with this
issue, I match the gap in rental prices of housing in the model to the gap in housing
rents for dwellings with a floor area of 30 to 40 sq.m. This range includes the average
floor area in both rural and urban regions. The remaining moments are estimated
using data from IHDS II.
The results presented in Table 1.5 show that the large wage gap between urban
25A possible issue with this estimation is the potential endogeneity between locations wages and
population shares. To the extent that this would lead to mismeasurement of the sorting effect in
the model, Section 1.6.4 presents robustness checks of the baseline results.
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Table 1.5: Joint Calibration
Parameter Value Moment Model Data
µr 1.39 Urban-rural wage gap 1.71 1.71
µp 1.22 Center-periphery wage gap 1.33 1.33
Cr 0.76 Urban-rural housing rent gap 2.01 2.01
Cs 0.17 Formal-slum housing rent gap 1.60 1.60
Acf 0.93 Share of population in urban 0.31 0.31
Acs 0.74 Share of urban population in slums 0.36 0.36
Apf 0.46 Share of formal population in periphery 0.22 0.22
Aps 0.36 Share of slum population in periphery 0.26 0.26
and rural regions implies a strong preference for rural amenities; that is, individuals
need to be compensated in urban regions for both the higher costs of living and the
lower level of amenities. This is consistent with the findings of Lagakos et al. (2018a)
and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016). In particular, the latter find that caste-based
insurance networks in rural India are an important barrier to urban migration. Also,
the wage gap between urban center and periphery implies that individuals living in
the center need to be compensated because amenities are lower. This may reflect the
fact that individuals are averse to living in the busiest areas of a city because there
is more pollution and noise, or it can be capturing differences in costs of non-traded
goods. Not surprisingly, the results show that central urban areas are more productive
31
Table 1.6: Educational Attainment: Model vs. Data
Location Model Data
Formal center 8.9 9.6
Slum center 7.5 7.4
Formal periphery 8.7 8.6
Slum periphery 6.8 5.9
Rural 6.6 6.1
Notes: Average education years in the data are calculated based on male population (25 years or older). Education
years were not targeted in the calibration of the model.
than the periphery and that is why they attract a larger share of the population. The
fact that productivity is the lowest in peripheral slums reflects, among other factors,
a lower access to infrastructure in those locations. While the model does not have
an explicit notion of distance, a low productivity in the urban periphery captures the
costs of commuting to the best jobs in the center.
Model Validation
The moments presented in Table 1.5 are all matched in the baseline economy. To
assess the quantitative implications of the model for other relevant moments of the
data, Table 1.6 compares average years of education across locations in the model and
the data. The model does very well in matching the levels of educational attainment
across locations. The gains from living in locations with high returns to schooling
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Table 1.7: Average Wage Gaps: Model vs. Data
Model Data
Targeted
Urban / Rural 1.71 1.71
Non-targeted
Formal / Rural 1.83 1.89
Slums / Rural 1.50 1.44
are larger for educated individuals and, thus, formal urban locations have residents
with higher educational attainment. I interpret this in the model as the fact that
education is more valuable for occupations in those locations.
Additionally, as shown in Table 1.7, the model generates a ratio of average wages
in slums to rural regions equal to 1.50, which is almost the same as the one observed
in the data: 1.44; and the ratio of average wages in formal urban to rural regions is
equal to 1.83 in the model, compared to 1.89 in the data. Lastly, Figure 1.4 presents
the variance of wages by type of urban neighborhood relative to the variance in rural
regions. The model does well in replicating the fact that wages variance is higher in
urban regions, especially in formal locations.
To summarize, the baseline economy in the model replicates the main empirical
facts presented in Section 1.2, namely urban-rural gaps in wages, education levels, and
housing rents, plus it is consistent with additional moments of the data. Armed with
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Figure 1.4: Baseline Economy: Urban Wages Variance
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this calibrated model, I now assess the aggregate implications of anti-slum policies
and housing distortions in India.
1.5.2 Counterfactual Policies
This section analyzes two types of counterfactual policies: (i) the demolition of
central slums, and (ii) the reduction of distortions in formal urban housing. The
forced eviction of slums dwellers is a common policy to modernize or sanitize cities
by recovering land occupied by squatters and use it for alternative projects, such
as commercial development or construction of high-value real estate. I compare the
effects of this type of policy with an alternative supported by the model, which is
reducing housing distortions in the formal housing sector. The model implies that
reducing distortions could increase the density of formal housing production per unit
of land, which in turn could decrease the rental price of housing in this sector. To
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assess the aggregate implications of these policies, I focus on changes in the share
of urban population, total output, and welfare. Total output takes into account the
consumption of individuals and landlords in urban locations. I also assess the effects
of these policies on different groups of the population.
Demolition of Central Slums
First, I evaluate the quantitative effects of demolishing central slums. In the model,
this can be introduced as an exogenous shock by reducing the share of land occupied
by central slums φc and reallocating the land to the formal housing sector. To be clear,
these experiments represent cases in which slums are destroyed, the land becomes
available to be used in the formal sector, and the market determines who can afford
the new formal housing. The potential benefit of this policy comes from the fact
that it increases the supply of housing in the formal urban center, which is the most
productive location in the city. To assess the impact of empirically reasonable cases, I
change the value of φc to induce a reduction in the share of population living in central
slums of 10%, 30%, and 50%. Table 1.8 presents the results of these experiments. If
50% of slum dwellers in the central slums are evicted, the share of urban population
decreases by 11%, total output goes down by 1.6%, and individuals experience an
average welfare loss of 1.2%. These aggregate outcomes seem small, but they are
non-trivial considering the fact that the share of total population living in central
slums is only 8.2%.
To understand these results, I simulate data and look at the effects on particular
groups of the population. I focus on the case in which the share of population living
in central slums is 50% lower. First, Table 1.9 presents the new location, welfare
change, and average education years of evicted dwellers. These are individuals who
choose to live in central slums in the baseline economy and change location when the
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Table 1.8: Aggregate Effects of Reducing Central Slums Population
Percentage change from a
Variable 10% reduction 30% reduction 50% reduction
Urban population share -2.0 -6.4 -11.1
Total Output -0.2 -0.8 -1.6
Individual Welfare -0.2 -0.7 -1.2
Notes: This table presents the results from reducing the share of population living in central slums by exogenously
decreasing the share of residential land occupied by slums in the model (φc).
share of land φc is reduced. Over 75% of them move to the rural region, 17% move
to formal housing in the urban center, 4% move to formal housing in the periphery,
and close to 3% moves to peripheral slums. One way to interpret these results is
that individuals have to relocate so far from the main areas of the city that they
effectively lose access to urban markets. Alternatively, these results suggest that if
central slums are destroyed, then urban migration would be even lower in India than
it already is. These results are consistent with the findings of Jedwab and Vollrath
(2019) regarding policies that limit urban migration into informal areas. The reason
most of the evicted dwellers relocate to the rural region is that formal housing is
expensive and the periphery is cheaper but not as productive, plus rental housing
prices would increase in the periphery if a large number of people moves there. In
contrast, the low price of housing and high value of amenities in the rural region
attracts more individuals.
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Table 1.9: Relocation, Welfare and Education of Evicted Slums Dwellers
New Location Location % share Welfare % change Education years
Rural 75.8 -7.9 7.0
Formal Center 17.2 -8.0 9.2
Formal Periphery 4.3 -8.5 9.0
Slum Periphery 2.8 -8.4 7.3
Notes: This table presents the new location, average welfare change, and average education years of evicted slum
dwellers after a change in φc induces a 50% reduction in the population share living in central slums.
Table 1.10: Welfare of Infra-marginal Individuals
Location % Change
Formal Center -0.3
Slum Center -16.5
Formal Periphery -1.1
Slum Periphery -1.0
Notes: This table presents the average welfare change of infra-marginal individuals (those who do not relocate) after
a change in φc induces a 50% reduction in the population share living in central slums.
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In addition, Column 3 of Table 1.9 presents the welfare change of evicted dwellers
in their new location. While the magnitude is similar for all locations, the small-
est loss is for those who move to the rural region because housing is cheaper and
amenities are higher. Those who move to formal housing in the center have access
to more productive and skill-intensive jobs, but they are forced to pay a higher price
of housing. Even if the newly available land puts a downward pressure on the rental
price of formal housing in the center, distortions limit the capacity to accommodate
more population and congestion partially offsets the reduction in rents. On the other
hand, those who move to locations in the urban periphery have the highest welfare
loss because productivity is lower, even if the value of amenities is higher in those
places. Note that the welfare loss of evicted dwellers is more than six times higher
than the average welfare loss in the economy.
The last column in Table 1.9 shows that the evicted dwellers with lowest level
of education move to the rural region and only the most educated ones move to the
formal urban sector. The latter is consistent with the argument that some slums
dwellers are relatively high-skill individuals who choose to live there because the
price of housing is low. That said, given that most individuals in India have a low
education level, these results suggest that the relevant welfare margin in terms of
spatial allocation of labor is between keeping a high concentration of population in
rural areas or allowing individuals to move to urban slums, even if they occupy land
illegally.
Next, Table 1.10 presents the welfare effects of this policy experiment on infra-
marginal individuals, those who do not move from their original location in the base-
line economy. Not surprisingly, the welfare loss is very high for those who remain in
central slums because housing prices increase due to the lower amount of land avail-
able for slums. This could also be interpreted as increasing expenditures on protection
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costs when governments are cracking down on slums. Infra-marginal individuals in
the formal center have a low welfare loss because having additional land for formal
development reduces the rental price of housing in this sector. Finally, the welfare
loss of infra-individuals in the periphery is primarily due to the fall in urban output
that is caused by the displacement of workers from the urban center.
To summarize, demolishing central slums leads to a fall in the urban population
share, total output, and welfare. Allocating more land to the formal housing sector
in the urban center attracts individuals who were previously on the margin of living
in this location or other place; however, given that most evicted dwellers from central
slums are displaced from the city, urban labor market loses individuals working in
relatively productive locations and, thus, urban output goes down. Individuals do not
stay in the periphery because productivity is low in those locations (e.g. lack of urban
infrastructure) and housing rents would increase if a large share of individuals moves
there. In this experiment, urban housing prices fall (except in central slums) because
urban housing demand is now lower, which partially offsets the welfare loss due to
lower urban output. Furthermore, selection plays an important role in these results.
When individuals leave the city, those who remain tend to have a relatively high
productivity. This limits the loss in average productivity from demolishing central
slums. Finally, the magnitude of the change in welfare and total output is similar to
the results of other papers based on spatial quantitative models, and to the welfare
gains that Cavalcanti et al. (2018) obtain from counterfactual policies regarding slums
in Brazil.
Reducing Distortions in Formal Housing
In this section I assess the quantitative effects of reducing distortions in the formal
housing sector. I do this by decreasing τ to a level that is consistent with the U.S.. As
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described in Section 1.5.1, I set τ equal to 0.55 based on the costs of taxes, fees and
approval procedures for housing development in India. A study from the National
Association of Home Builders done by Emrath (2016) finds that regulations imposed
by government at all levels account for 24% of the final price of a new home in the U.S..
I take this value as the equivalent comparison to India, which implies a reduction in τ
of 31 percentage points. Even if housing regulations are costly in the U.S., this seems
a reasonable comparison given that housing markets in India are highly distorted.
The results presented in Table 1.11 show that the urban population increases by
20% and the share of the urban population living in slums decreases by 19%. Further-
more, total output and individual welfare increase by 2.4% and 2.6%, respectively.
These results suggest that distortions in the formal housing sector in India represent
an important barrier to urban migration and keep a large share of the urban popula-
tion living in slums. Eliminating burdensome regulations would not only increase the
urbanization rate and the access to formal housing, but would also raise aggregate
labor productivity and welfare.
The reason productivity gains are small, in comparison to the wage gaps across
locations observed in the data, is because selection plays an important quantitative
role in the model. That is, while individual productivity increases in cities because
education has higher returns, new urban migrants have a relatively low level of urban
talent. If individuals with a strong comparative advantage for urban occupations
already live in the city, then productivity gains from urban migration should not be
huge. This is consistent with papers that find limited welfare gains from encouraging
urban migration (e.g. Lagakos et al. (2018a)).
To analyze the effects of this counterfactual policy on particular groups of the
population, Table 1.12 presents the welfare gains of new dwellers and infra-marginal
individuals. Those individuals who are now living in formal urban housing experience
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Table 1.11: Aggregate Effects of Reducing Formal Housing Distortions to U.S. Level
Variable % Change
Urban population share 20.5
Slum population (urban share) -18.8
Total Output 2.4
Individual Welfare 2.6
Note: This table presents the results from increasing formal housing supply in urban regions by reducing τ to 0.24.
The baseline value was equal to 0.55.
Table 1.12: Welfare Gains of New Dwellers and Infra-marginal Individuals
Urban housing New Dwellers Infra-marginal
Formal Center 4.9 10.1
Slum Center 1.0 1.9
Formal Periphery 4.9 10.1
Slum Periphery 0.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the average welfare change (%) of new dwellers and infra-marginal individuals (those who
do not relocate) after reducing τ to 0.24. The baseline value was equal to 0.55.
41
Figure 1.5: Interaction of Destroying Central Slums and Housing Distortions
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Notes: This figure presents the effects of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0.
a welfare gain of 5%, while those who move to slums gain 1%. The welfare gain of
infra-marginal dwellers is around two times higher for both types of neighborhoods.
These gains are due to the lower price of formal housing and the growth of urban
population. The fact that a larger share of the urban population is living in for-
mal housing implies that individual productivity increases through higher education
returns and location productivity.
A key motivation to focus on the case of India was the interaction of inefficient ur-
ban policies and anti-slum policies. To analyze this, Figure 1.5 presents the effects of
destroying central slums (φc = 0) on total output and urban population for different
values of housing distortions τ . The results show that housing distortions substan-
tially amplify the effects of destroying central slums. The fall in urban population
is more than 10 percentage points higher when distortions are similar to the level in
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India (τ = 0.55) than in the case with no distortions (τ = 0). Similarly, the loss in
total output is significantly lower when there are no distortions in the formal housing
sector. The effects on total output are not as dramatic as the effect on the allocation
of workers because the city becomes “exclusive” when central slums are destroyed,
and only those individuals with a strong comparative advantage remain in urban re-
gions. These results imply that policies aiming to sanitize cities by demolishing slums
located in the most valuable locations are more likely to deter urban migration and
produce negative welfare effects in the presence of restrictive building regulations.
Implications for India’s Urbanization
India has a relatively low urbanization rate for its level of economic development (see
Figure 1.1). The model was calibrated to match an urban population share equal
to 31% and a share of the urban population in slums equal to 36%. Countries with
similar level of GDP per capita have an average urban population share of 46% and
an average share of the urban population in slums equal to 43%.26
I use the model to see how much of the gap in urban population share between
India and countries with similar development can be explained by housing distortions.
I compare these results to a case in which the amount of land occupied by slums is
increased to match the share of the urban population living in slums in countries
with similar levels of development (this is equivalent to a more lenient policy towards
slums). The results presented in Table 1.13 show that eliminating distortions raises
the share of urban population by 33%, which implies increasing the share from 31%
to almost 41%. Thus, holding all else constant, housing distortions alone can account
26This is based on World Bank data from 2014. GDP per capita (PPP) in India was $5,678 and
the comparison is made with respect to countries with a GDP per capita between $4,000 and $7,000,
which had available data on both urban and slums population.
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Table 1.13: Two Ways of Increasing Urbanization in India
Variable (% change) τ = 0 ↑ φx
Total Output 3.6 0.3
Individual Welfare 4.4 0.7
Urban population 32.7 6.7
Slum population (urban share) -27.5 19.4
Note: This table presents the effects (% change) of eliminating housing distortions and increasing the amount of
land in slums, independently. The amount of land is increased to match a share of the urban population living in
slums equal to 43%. See text for details.
for a high share of the relatively low urbanization rate in India. Moreover, output and
welfare gains are substantially larger in the case where the share of urban population
raises by decreasing housing distortions. In the case where slums occupy more land,
the share of urban population increases by less than 7%. These results suggest that
eliminating distortions in housing markets is a more effective policy to boost urban-
ization. Allowing slums to occupy more land increases the access to urban markets
where labor productivity is higher, but it raises the price of formal housing because
there is less land available for that sector.
One question suggested by the previous results is the following. Given the level of
distortions and value of location fundamentals, is there an optimal level of land that
should be occupied by central slums? The answer is yes. Starting from the baseline
economy, increasing the share of land in central slums has small but positive effects
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on total output and urban population. In fact, total output and urban population
display an inverted U-shaped relationship with the share of land occupied by central
slums. This is due to fact that the cheap housing sector is expanding in the most
productive urban region and workers with a low productivity in rural areas are moving
to the city; moreover, the formal housing sector can substitute intermediate inputs
for land so the population size in this sector is not affected greatly at first. However,
as more land is allocated to slums, substituting intermediate inputs for land becomes
increasingly costly and the formal housing sector starts collapsing, causing negative
effects on total output and urban population. If all land in the urban center is
allocated to slums, the value of these variables falls below their value in the baseline
economy. These results imply that governments could increase the urbanization rate
by making cities more inclusive in the sense of allowing the expansion of slums. But
they also imply that creating a “slum city” leads to a decrease in the urban population
share and total output because human capital and productivity are relatively low in
those locations.
Demolition of Central Slums and Urban Sprawl
The last experiment I consider is a case where demolishing central slums is combined
with an expansion of residential land in the urban periphery. This can be thought of
as urban sprawl in the sense that the city is expanding spatially. To analyze this in the
model, I exogenously increase the amount of residential land in the periphery so that
the share of urban population remains constant after 50% of dwellers are evicted from
central slums (by reducing the amount of land they occupy). To simplify the analysis
of this counterfactual, I keep the share of land occupied by slums in the periphery
constant. The purpose of this experiment is to avoid the fall in urban population
caused by the displacement of individuals from central slums, and focus on the effects
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Table 1.14: Demolition of Central Slums and Urban Sprawl
Variable (% change) Baseline Expanding land supply in periphery
Total Output -1.61 -1.67
Welfare -1.21 -0.02
Notes: This table presents the results of reducing the population share in central slums by 50% and, at the same
time, increasing the total supply of residential land in the periphery to keep the share or urban population constant.
of allowing individuals to move to or stay in the city but in less productive, peripheral
locations.
The comparison of results presented in Table 1.14 shows that the loss in total
output is larger than in the baseline case, but the fall in average welfare is almost
zero in the case with a higher amount of land in the periphery. The reason for the
smaller effect on welfare is that a large increase in peripheral land is required to
keep urban population constant (more than 4 times the baseline value) and the new
land is more valuable for peripheral slums, the unregulated housing sector that is
land intensive, so the rental price of housing in this location falls below the rural
level. This is equivalent to a situation in which central slums population is replaced
by more population living in peripheral slums, where land does not have a high
value and housing is cheap. Thus, the welfare loss of living in peripheral slums
where productivity and education returns are low is offset by the gains of paying an
extremely low rental price of housing in such locations.
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1.6 Extensions and Robustness
This section considers the quantitative implications of possible extensions to the
baseline model, as well as robustness exercises. For each of the cases presented below,
I repeat the joint calibration to match the moments in Table 1.5. To compare the
same policy shock in the baseline and extensions, I focus on the case where all slums
in the center are destroyed: φc = 0; otherwise, the change in the amount of land
occupied my central slums required to generate a specific change in population might
vary across cases.
1.6.1 Commuting from Urban Periphery to Center
The baseline model assumes that individuals work where they live (their labor
market is determined by their place of residence) based on the fact that commuting
is extremely limited in India; however, in cities like Mumbia people do commute from
the periphery to the center. In order to assess the quantitative importance of allowing
commuting, I modify the model in the following way. I assume that individuals who
live in formal housing in the urban periphery can commute and work in the same
jobs as individuals living in formal housing in the center, but they face a commuting
cost. Similarly, individuals living in periphery slums can commute and access the
labor market of center slums subject to a commuting cost. To be clear, I assume that
individuals now have two extra draws of location-specific talent {νpcf , νpcs}. Each of
these draws is the idiosyncratic productivity of living in the periphery and working
in the center and, similarly to the baseline, can be interpreted as individual talent for
the types of jobs representative of that particular residence-workplace situation.
In addition, I assume that individuals lose a fraction of their income if they com-
mute from the periphery to the center equal to κj, j ∈ {f, s}. This commuting cost
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varies by type of housing to reflect the fact that commuting costs represent a differ-
ent share of income for poor individuals than for rich ones. Then, for example, labor
income net of commuting costs of an individual living in the formal periphery and
working in the formal center is equal to: ωcf zi,pcf (1−κf ).27 To calibrate commuting
costs in this version of the model, I use data on the share of commuters by city zone
in Mumbia from Baker et al. (2005). To be specific, I target the following moments:
share of slums dwellers in the periphery that commute to the center equal to 26%,
and share of formal housing dwellers in the periphery that commute to the center
equal to 34%.28
Table 1.15 compares the aggregate effects of destroying central slums in the base-
line model with the case that includes commuting. The results show that allowing
for commuting leads to a lower decrease in the share of urban population, as well
as lower losses of total output and individual welfare. Intuitively, the periphery is a
more attractive place and more individuals remain in the city when central slums are
destroyed, which means that the concentration of talent in rural areas is lower in the
case with commuting. Overall, introducing commuting to the model is this particular
way does not have a large impact on the results. The reason is that to match the
distribution of population across locations in the city, the joint calibration implies
27Commuting costs are introduced as as an income tax, however, they represent the actual expen-
ditures on commuting (e.g. bus or train), plus the income that is lost due to commuting time and
the possible productivity loss caused by a stressful commuting.
28I assume that the periphery of Mumbai is equal to zones 4 and 6 in the cited study, which is
consistent with the definition used in calibraiton of the baseline model. The study does not report
commuting times by type of housing, only by income category. I use data from Table D-1 and assume
that slums dwellers are the same as the poorest income category, and the formal sector represents
the third income category (low to high). According to this study most commuting happens between
adjacent zones and the share of commuters from the periphery to the commercial area in the south
of the city is low.
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Table 1.15: Aggregate Effects of Destroying Central Slums: Allowing Commuting
Variable (% change) Baseline With commuting
Urban population share -25.7 -23.9
Total Output -6.8 -5.6
Individual Welfare -2.7 -2.5
Notes: This table presents the effects of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0. The baseline
results are compared to the case where individuals can commute from the urban periphery to the center.
that peripheral locations are not attractive places to live because productive is low
and commuting costs are high.
1.6.2 Decreasing Returns in Rural Production
In the baseline model rural production uses a technology with constant returns to
scale. This section explores the implications of introducing decreasing returns in rural
production. The possible argument to evaluate this extension is that agriculture is
the main activity in rural regions and a fixed amount of land at the production unit
level generates the possibility of having decreasing returns to labor. To introduce this
in the model, rural output is now given by Yr = Ar Z
β
r , where 0 < β < 1. I consider
a case with strong decreasing returns by setting β equal to 0.5.
Table 1.17 presents the effects of destroying central slums in the case with de-
creasing returns in rural production, as well as the comparison with the baseline
results. According to these results, with decreasing returns in rural production the
fall in urban population is smaller. While most evicted dwellers are still displaced to
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Table 1.16: Aggregate Effects of Destroying Central Slums: with Decreasing Returns
in Rural Production
Variable (% change) Baseline With rural decreasing returns
Urban population share -25.7 -19.0
Total Output -6.8 -7.9
Individual Welfare -2.7 -5.1
Notes: This table presents the effects of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0. Decreasing returns
in rural production are introduced by defining Yr = ArZ
β
r , with β = 0.5.
the rural region, this location becomes less attractive as people move there because
congestion in rural production drives wages down. In addition, the loss in total out-
put is larger compared to the baseline case because rural labor productivity falls as
individuals move there. The welfare loss is also larger because more individuals stay
in the city, but either they pay a higher housing price in the urban center, or live
in the less productive peripheral region. In the baseline case, individuals displaced
to the rural region paid a lower housing rent and received higher amenities, without
putting downward pressure on rural wages.
These results suggest that decreasing returns in rural production might be quan-
titatively important; however, Lagakos et al. (2018a) find a value of β equal to 0.91
for the case of Bangladesh, which implies much weaker decreasing returns in rural
production than the ones considered in the experiment presented.29
29The findings in Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2014) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) suggest that
rural wages do not increase substantially with urban migration in India. This is also not consistent
with strong decreasing returns in rural production.
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1.6.3 Endogenous Agglomeration Forces
The baseline model assumes exogenous location productivities and regional ameni-
ties. This section introduces endogenous agglomeration and congestion forces to
urban regions in the model. In contrast to rural regions, cities feature agglomer-
ation economies that come from firms and consumers locating close to each other;
however, as people move to cities there is more traffic, crime, and pollution. To in-
troduce these forces in the model, I define location productivities in urban locations
` ∈ {cf, cs, pf, ps} as
A` = A` Z
λ
x , (1.20)
where A` represents the exogenous component of productivity and Zx = Zxf + Zxs
is the supply of efficiency units of labor in urban region x ∈ {c, p}. Thus, location
productivity raises with the amount and talent of residents in the region. This defini-
tion allows for human capital spillovers across types of neighborhoods in each urban
region and parameter λ governs the strength of these spillovers. On the other hand,
urban regional amenities are now given by
µx = µx pi
γ
x , (1.21)
where µx represents exogenous amenities and pix = pixf +pixs is the share of population
living in the region. Parameter γ governs the degree of congestion (if negative). This
specification implies that the share of population living in slums affects the utility of
individuals living in formal housing within both urban regions.
To analyze the quantitative results of the extended model, I take the value of
agglomeration and congestion parameters from the literature. Following Bryan and
Morten (2018), I set λ equal to 0.05 and γ equal to -0.075. Table 1.17 compares the
aggregate effects of destroying central slums with and without endogenous agglomer-
ation and congestion. In the model with externalities, the fall in urban population is
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Table 1.17: Aggregate Effects of Destroying Central Slums: with Endogenous Ag-
glomeration Forces
With endogenous
Variable (% change) Baseline agglomaration forces
Urban population share -25.7 -24.1
Total Output -6.8 -7.0
Individual Welfare -2.7 -2.2
Notes This table presents the effects (% change) of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0.
Endogenous agglomeration forces refers to human capital spillovers and amenities congestion in urban regions.
smaller, as well as the average welfare loss. The latter is due to the fact that evicting
slums dwellers reduces amenities congestion in central urban areas. However, the loss
in output is now larger because human capital spillovers decreased in the city.
These results imply that introducing externalities has a small quantitative ef-
fect and exogenous location fundamentals are the main drivers of the results. That
said, agglomeration and residential externalities are difficult to measure and there
is not much evidence for poor countries. To address the latter, Table 1.18 presents
robustness checks for the parameters governing the strength of these externalities.
According to the results, demolishing central slums causes a larger fall in total out-
put when there are strong productivity spillovers, this is because productivity and
returns to education are higher in central urban regions and displacing workers from
these locations implies a large loss in human capital externalities. On the other hand,
the loss in output is smaller when productivity spillovers are weak and there is con-
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Table 1.18: Different Strengths of Agglomeration and Congestion: Effects on Total
Output (% Change)
Amenities congestion
Productivity spillover γ = 0.05 γ = −0.05
λ = 0.01 -7.5 -6.6
λ = 0.1 -9.8 -8.2
Notes: This table presents the effects (% change) of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0.
gestion in amenities. In this case, evicting slums dwellers from the center decreases
the level of congestion for those who stay in the region, while the agglomeration ef-
fects on productivity are small. Overall, the qualitative results of the baseline case
do not change with different degrees of endogenous agglomeration forces. However,
externalities could have bigger effects in a model of a city with a large number of
locations interacting through commuting (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis
(2018)).
1.6.4 Robustness
This section evaluates the robustness of my findings to different parameter values.
First, Table 1.19 presents the results of reducing the population in central slums
considering lower values of the elasticity of substitution across urban locations, and
using alternative values of the adjusted shape parameter in the distribution of talent.
According to these results, the change in urban population is quite sensitive to the
level of substitutability between labor from different urban locations. When the
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Table 1.19: Robustness: Destroying Central Slums
Elasticity Substitution Shape parameter
Variable (% change) Baseline σ = 3 σ = 6 θ = 3 θ = 12
Urban population -25.7 -44.6 -29.8 -24.4 -30.2
Total Output -6.8 -11.9 -8.0 -7.5 -5.0
Notes: This table presents the effects (% change) of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0.
Baseline values are σ = 9 and θ = 4.13.
elasticity of substitution is lower and, therefore, the complementarity is stronger, the
fall in urban output is higher as workers from central slums are displaced. The latter
also explains why the loss in total output is larger compared to the baseline.
On the other hand, the results presented in the last column of Table 1.19 show
that the aggregate effects of destroying central slums are less sensitive to changes in
the adjusted shape parameter. A larger value of θ implies a higher correlation across
location-specific talent or a lower variation in individual productivity. Thus, with a
large value of θ there is less scope for comparative advantage and the sorting effect
on productivity is weaker. This explains why the loss in output is somewhat lower in
comparison to the baseline; however, the fall in urban population is higher because
individuals are more sensitive to location-specific characteristics such as the rental
price of housing.
Finally, in the baseline case, location-specific Mincer returns were estimated as-
suming that they represent technological differences in the value of skills across loca-
tions. However, these differences in returns to education could also represent selection
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Table 1.20: Robustness: Destroying Central Slums Accounting for Selection in Re-
turns to Education
Variable (% change) Baseline Selection in education returns
Urban population -25.7 -26.0
Total Output -6.8 -7.2
Notes: This table presents the effects (% change) of destroying central slums in the model by setting φc = 0. To
account for selection I reduce urban returns by 50% of their difference with respect to the return in rural regions.
of talented workers. That is, returns to education could be higher in urban regions
because individuals with more cognitive talent choose to live there. To assess the
implications of overestimating the importance of technological differences in the use
of education across locations, I reduce the value of Mincer returns in urban locations
by 50% of their difference with respect to the rural region. Doing this implies that the
model will underestimate the difference in educational attainment between urban and
rural areas because the complementarity between individual education and schooling
returns is weaker.
The results in Table 1.18 show that the qualitative implications do not change
after accounting for selection in returns to education. The effects are larger in this
case because, in order to match the moments of data, other location fundamentals
must adjust; in particular, the value of productivity in urban locations has to be
higher to be consistent with the share of population living there. Moreover, in the
baseline economy there is more complementarity between education level and returns
to education, so the loss in output is smaller when the least educated individuals
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leave the city than the case where individuals with similar levels of education leave.
In other words, as differences in returns to education disappear in the model, there
is less selection in education across locations.
1.7 Conclusion
Slums are a prevalent urban phenomenon in developing countries. Policy responses
to their formation vary from upgrading programs to forced evictions of dwellers. India
is a case in which slums have been demolished in central urban areas with the idea
that displaced dwellers relocate to peripheral regions where land is less valuable. This
type of anti-slum policies are also observed in other developing countries, such as
Zimbabwe and Nigeria. However, slums are formed in urban centers because workers
want to live close to the best jobs in a city.
This paper develops a spatial general equilibrium framework to assess the quan-
titative impact of anti-slum policies in a context where formal housing markets are
highly distorted. The model takes into account individual selection and differences in
local productivity, returns to education, regional amenities, and housing rents. The
findings imply that demolishing central slums shrinks the size of urban population
because only a small share of evicted dwellers can afford to stay in formal housing and
the urban periphery is not attractive. This is consistent with the fact that India has
a small urban population share compared to countries with similar and lower levels of
development. The losses in welfare and labor productivity are significant considering
the fact that only a small fraction of the total population lives in central slums. Even
if valuable land becomes available for formal development when slums are destroyed,
most of the evicted dwellers lose access to the labor market opportunities they had
in central urban regions.
I also use the model to assess the effects of reducing formal housing distortions in
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India to the U.S. level. The results imply that these distortions account for a big share
of the low urbanization rate in India and keep a high fraction of the urban population
living in slums. Moreover, reducing housing distortions raises total output because
individuals with low talent for rural activities move to the city and gain access to
locations where productivity and returns to education are high. Thus, eliminating
distortions in formal housing markets, such as restrictive FARs or large approval
costs, has substantial effects on the spatial allocation of talent and aggregate labor
productivity.
A possible direction for future research is exploring the political economy of slums
and the implications for aggregate outcomes. It seems crucial to understand under
what economic conditions governments find it profitable to increase the provision of
urban infrastructure and public services in slums, and under what conditions they
choose forced evictions. Research could aim to understand the role of interest groups
in policies regarding slums. For example, groups representing residents of formal
housing seem to put pressure on governments to sanitize cities by demolishing slums.
Rent seeking behaviors can have a great impact on the allocation of land in urban
regions and, therefore, on the allocation of workers across space.
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Chapter 2
CROP CHOICE, TRADE COSTS, AND
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
2.1 Introduction
A large body of literature documents that studying agriculture is critical for under-
standing cross-country income differences.1 The reason is twofold. First, while poor
countries are much less productive in aggregate output per worker, the productivity
gaps are particularly large in agriculture. Second, despite these large productivity
gaps, poor countries allocate a high share of their labor force to agriculture. Com-
bined, these two facts prompt a key question: why do poor countries devote so much
labor to such an unproductive sector?
Taking a closer look at agricultural production reveals a striking pattern within
this sector. Figure 2.1 compares yields and harvested land between two categories
of crops: (i) grains, including the most important staples such as maize and wheat;
and (ii) fruits, which are usually grown as cash crops.2 Almost every poor country
allocates a large share of their land to produce staple crops, even though yields of cash
crops are significantly higher. While similar patterns can be found in richer countries,
there are two reasons these facts are especially important in poor countries: (i) a
high share of the population works in agriculture, which means a large share of the
1See Gollin et al. (014b) for a summary of the topic.
2This figure shows output value per hectare. In poor countries, this could be a good approxi-
mation to value added per hectare since intermediate inputs usage is low; however, comparing land
productivity across crops, especially in rich countries, would require value added at the crop level.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no public source with such data.
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labor force produces low-productivity crops; and (ii) producing fruits involves labor-
intensive activities such as picking and stacking, thus poor countries could exploit
their production given the capital constraints and labor-intensive techniques of most
farmers.
The main goal of this paper is to further refine this puzzle. I use detailed, re-
stricted access data from Mexican farms to document two facts. First, while Mexican
agriculture is much less productive than non-agriculture, the productivity gaps in
value added per worker are much larger for staple crops. Second, despite these large
productivity differences, farm labor in Mexico is mostly devoted to staples production.
Together, these two facts suggest that we can focus on an even narrower question:
why do poor countries devote so much labor to unproductive staple crops?
This paper proposes an explanation based on two key mechanisms that determine
the efficient crop choice by farmers: subsistence requirements of staple crops and
interregional trade costs. The former is based on the observation that the share of
production used for family consumption is large for staples. These crops have a high
caloric content and represent an important nutritional source for poor farmers who
have incentives to produce their own food. The second mechanism is based on the fact
that trade costs affect the relative farm price between types of crops. Trade costs are
especially high for fruits, so farmers receive a smaller share of the market value and
must offer relatively low prices to be competitive. This means that only those farmers
who are highly productive in fruits farming produce in that sector. Moreover, enough
labor and land need to be allocated to farming staple crops when food is costly to
move across regions in a country, especially to densely populated urban regions.
To formalize the analysis, I build a general equilibrium model with interregional
trade and self-selection of heterogeneous farmers into type of crops. The model fea-
tures non-homothetic preferences, costly trade across regions, and the existence of two
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Figure 2.1: Land Allocation and Yields in Poor Countries and Mexico
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Source: FAO, 2010.
agricultural goods: a staple crop (maize) and a cash crop (fruit). In this framework,
farmers choose to produce either type of crop as an efficient response to subsistence
requirements of staple food and trade costs. The existence of the latter causes a neg-
ative “income effect” in the economy, which increases the relative demand for staple
food and, therefore, the relative price of maize. This is due to the fact that income
elasticity of demand for staple food is less than one. Additionally, the selection of
farmers into staple crops is amplified by the fact that trade costs are higher for fruits.
I calibrate the model to match features of the Mexican economy. For the topic
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of interest in this paper, Mexico is poor enough and the share of labor in agriculture
(13.6% in 2014) is large compared to rich countries (1.6% in the U.S.). Furthermore,
the yield gap between staples and cash crops is similar to poorer countries as shown
in Figure 2.1, and, unlike many of the latter, it has good quality agricultural data.3
In particular, I use detailed farm data on prices, production value, expenses, em-
ployment, and land usage at the crop level. I estimate trade costs from price gaps of
homogeneous goods across regions in the country; thus, the definition of trade costs is
broad and includes more than just transportation costs between distant regions, they
also represent possible monopoly power of intermediaries. The quantitative results
of the model imply that trade costs can account for a large share of labor allocated
to maize and low labor productivity in agriculture. In a counterfactual case with-
out trade costs, agricultural labor productivity increases by 21% and the ratio of
employment in maize to fruits decreases by 19%.
This paper is related to the recent macroeconomic literature that has tried to
explain agricultural productivity differences across countries. Restuccia et al. (2008)
document that differences between rich and poor countries in Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per worker in agriculture are over two times higher than differences in aggre-
gate GDP per worker.4 Furthermore, they show that barriers to access intermediate
inputs can account for large cross-country differences in agricultural employment and
productivity.5 Recent papers in this literature have taken into account production
decisions within agriculture, for example, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2015) develop
3Statistical agencies in the poorest countries have limited resources and data is usually unreliable.
See Jerven (2013).
4Caselli (2005) finds similar aggregate and sectoral productivity differences across countries.
5Alternative explanations are given by Vollrath (2009), Lagakos and Waugh (2013), Young (2013),
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), Gollin et al. (014a), Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015), Her-
rendorf and Schoellman (2018), Donovan (2018), and Alvarez (2018).
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a model that features crop choice to analyze the effects of land reforms on farm size
and agricultural productivity in the Philippines. I focus on the interaction of trade
costs and subsistence requirements of staple food as a determinant of resource allo-
cation within agriculture, and how the sorting of farmers across types of crops affects
agricultural labor productivity.
Additionally, this paper is closely related to recent literature that examines the
effects of transportation costs on interregional trade using general equilibrium trade
models. In particular, Donaldson (2018) studies the effects on trade and welfare of
large transportation infrastructure projects using detailed data from India.6 I build
on the methodology of this literature to measure sector-specific trade costs across
regions, and construct a unique dataset that combines farm and market data to
compare prices of homogeneous goods between origins and destinations in Mexico.
Lastly, this is not the first paper that studies the relationship between trade and
agricultural productivity. Tombe (2015) develops a multi-sector model with subsis-
tence requirements to analyze the effects of trade costs on agricultural productivity
differences across countries; and Sotelo (2018) studies the effects of regional trade
frictions on welfare and farm productivity using data from Peru.7 My focus is on
documenting differences in labor and land productivity across crops using farm data
that allows me to measure value added at the crop level, and building a quantita-
tive model to assess the importance of trade costs for crop choices and low agricul-
tural labor productivity. Furthermore, this paper interprets subsistence agriculture
as farmers who choose to produce staple crops instead of high-value cash crops.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a description
6See Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) and Alder (2019) for similar approaches.
7Adamopoulos (2011), Herrendorf et al. (2012), and Gollin and Rogerson (2014) also focus on
the links between trade costs, agriculture, and economic development.
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of the microdata used in this paper, as well as empirical evidence on crop productiv-
ities and trade costs in agricultural markets in Mexico. Next, Section 2.3 introduces
a multi-sector selection model with interregional trade. Section 2.4 provides a de-
scription of the calibration and presents the quantitative results of counterfactual
experiments using the model. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
To present the empirical evidence, I simplify the analysis by narrowing down the
number of crops considered. Based on its production volume, harvested land, and
relevance for subsistence, maize is the most important crop in Mexico. In this paper
I will use it as a benchmark of staple crops and compare it to other fruits that are
among the most important cash crops in the country.
I use restricted access, farm-level data from agricultural surveys in Mexico. These
microdata is part of the Encuesta Nacional Agropecuaria (ENA) 2014.8 The surveys
were taken from a sample of 75,148 farms in 25,800 localities of the country during the
agricultural cycle from fall 2013 to fall 2014. They gathered nationally representative
data for 34 products that were chosen based on their contribution to GDP. The unit
of observation in the survey is defined as a unit of agricultural production formed
by a set of plots located in the same municipality. Since more than one crop can be
grown by a unit of production throughout the agricultural year, each observation in
the database represents a farm-crop pair. The target population of the surveys were
all the production units that reported data for one of the products of interest in the
agricultural census 2007.
8Access provided by the Sistema Nacional de Informacio´n Estad´ıstica y Geogra´fica (SNIEG) of
the Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa (INEGI). The views and conclusions expressed are
exclusive of the author and do not reflect official positions or statistics of SNIEG, or INEGI.
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The ENA 2014 surveys have detailed information by variety of crop at the farm
level. For each crop that is grown in a farm, the surveys report harvested land
and production volume; amounts of production used for family consumption, feed,
and seed; farm-gate prices of output sold; quantities used of fertilizers; and farmers’
expenses in different stages of production. The latter include expenditures on modern
inputs such as chemicals, pesticides, and irrigation. In addition, hired labor and other
farm expenses are reported at the farm level. The fact that most expenditures are
reported at the crop level allows me to calculate valued added for each of them. This
is key to make productivity comparisons across crops. The detailed information on
prices, output, and expenditures of each crop produced in a farm, plus its geographical
location, imply that this data is subject to confidentiality regulations.
In addition to the microdata described above, I use various sources of agricultural
data provided by Mexico’s government agencies. Specifically, I use data from the
Sistema Nacional de Informacio´n e Integracio´n de Mercados (SNIIM) to get data on
wholesale prices for specific varieties of crops in every state of the country. These
data provide the place of origin (state) for each variety sold in a market.
2.2.1 Crop Productivity
In this section I show that productivity in maize farming is significantly lower
than productivity in fruit farming. I consider two measures of crop productivity:
value added per worker and value added per hectare. I calculate value added for each
farm-crop observation in the following way. First, I obtain the value of production
net of the amount used for seed and animal feed; then, I subtract expenditures on
fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation. Since the amount of labor is reported at the farm
level, I focus on farms producing one type of crop to measure labor productivity. See
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Appendix B for more details.9
Panel A in Figure 2.2 shows aggregate value added per worker for different fruits
relative to value added per worker in maize. For most of these fruits, labor produc-
tivity is over two times higher than in maize, and the average productivity gap is
around six. In comparison, the ratio of value added per worker in non-agriculture to
agriculture was 5.7 in Mexico during 2013. Thus, the agricultural productivity gap
in Mexico has a similar magnitude to the productivity gap between fruits and maize.
However, despite these large productivity differences, Panel B shows that labor al-
located to maize is much higher than any of the fruits considered. All these crops
together add up to 46% of total workers allocated to maize. These facts imply that
highly unproductive crops like maize decrease the value of agricultural labor produc-
tivity in the country. Moreover, Figure 2.4 presents the gaps in aggregate value added
per hectare for the same group of crops. The differences in land productivity between
maize and fruits are even larger than the labor productivity gaps.
One possible concern with the aggregate results described in the previous para-
graph is that such productivity gaps are driven by differences in farm size between
maize and fruit producers, or by particular regions of the country that are highly
productive in fruit farming. To address these issues, I estimate productivity gaps
between types of crops controlling for state and farm size. The results presented in
Table 2.1 show that productivity is significantly larger for fruits than for maize even
if such controls are taken into account. That is, adjusting for region and the size
of farms, the labor productivity gap between fruits and maize is 3.4 (the raw gap is
5.8), while the land productivity gap is 4.5 (the raw gap is 4.8). The adjusted pro-
ductivity gaps are smaller, but still sizable. Appendix C provides additional evidence
9The results from this section are complemented in Appendix D using alternative sources of
public aggregate data.
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Figure 2.2: Panel A. Value Added per Worker Relative to Maize
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Figure 2.3: Panel B. Total Workers Relative to Maize
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Notes: Maize is normalized to 1 in both cases. Total workers includes family members participating in farming
activities.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from SNIEG and INEGI: ENA 2014.
suggesting that farmers do not choose to grow maize because fruits are unproductive
or infeasible to grow in their region; even if some regions of the country are more
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Figure 2.4: Value Added per Hectare Relative to Maize
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Notes: Maize is normalized to 1.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from SNIEG and INEGI: ENA 2014.
suitable to grow fruits, it is not the case that maize is the only productive option for
most farmers.
The empirical results presented in this section suggest the idea that a significant
fraction of farmers must be relatively unproductive at producing staple crops: not
every farmer has the best land to grow maize, nor the set of skills or knowledge
required to manage such type of farms. The fact that most farmers decide to grow
staple crops implies that there might be barriers amplifying the selection of farmers
into those crops.
2.2.2 Trade Costs
This section presents evidence that trade costs are large in agricultural markets
in Mexico. I measure these costs indirectly using differences in prices across regions.
Thus, trade costs consist of more than just moving goods across distant regions, in-
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Table 2.1: Productivity Gaps: Fruits Relative to Maize
Value Added per Worker Raw Gap Adjusted Gap
Gap 5.8 3.4
State fixed effects, farm size No Yes
Observations 26,197 26,197
Value Added per Hectare Raw Gap Adjusted Gap
Gap 4.8 4.5
State fixed effects, farm size No Yes
Observations 33,189 33,189
Notes: Results obtained from regressing log(value added per worker) and log(value added per hectare) on a dummy
that takes a value of 1 for fruits and 0 for maize. The gap reported is the exponential of the estimated dummy
coefficient. Controls include (log) agricultural land of the farm and state dummies. The coefficient of fruits is
significant at the 1% level in every case. Regressions are weighted by worker and hectares, respectively.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from INEGI-ENA 2014.
stead they reflect the quality of infrastructure for transportation and storage in each
region, and how competitive markets are. My data satisfies two important charac-
teristics to measure trade costs using spatial price gaps: (i) homogeneous products;
and (ii) regions that are actually trading with each other. Donaldson (2018) uses a
similar empirical strategy using regional varieties of salt in India.
First, to measure trade costs of crops, I compare farm-gate prices with wholesale
market prices across states in 2014.10 I build a unique dataset of prices for specific
10These wholesale markets are large supply centers of agricultural products located in the main
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crop varieties by combining farm data from ENA 2014 surveys with market prices
listed in SNIIM. The latter are reported monthly, so I calculate the average price in
2014 for each crop in every market. Since market prices only specify the state of origin
for each product, I also aggregate farm prices to the state-level. Price gaps between
each origin and destination are measure as the farm price divided by the wholesale
price (which I define as the farm share). I only consider origins and destinations that
are potentially trading, that is, observations in which the destination had a price
greater or equal than the origin price. After this, I end up with 930 origin-destination
observations for 68 fruits and grains traded across 30 states.11
The median farm share is 59% for grains and 36% for fruits. This means that
a maize farmer receives more than half of the wholesale value, while a fruit farmer
receives a little more than a third of the value. Specifically, the median farm share
of maize (white) is 69%; in comparison, the median farm share of avocado (hass)
and pepper (poblano) are 49% and 32%, respectively. One possible concern with
these results is that fruits might be traded to further distances than grains. In the
second column of Table 2.2, I present the raw gap in trade costs between cash crops
and maize, while the third column shows the estimated gap controlling for origin-
destination fixed effects. There is almost no differences between raw and adjusted
gaps; thus, the differences in trade costs are not driven by differences in trading
routes.
These estimates are in line with previous studies on Mexico’s agricultural sector
according to which farmers in fruits and vegetables markets receive between 35% and
45% of retail prices. According to these studies, the existence of few intermediaries
cities of every state.
11I do not consider Baja California and Baja California Sur due to their isolated geographical
location.
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Table 2.2: Trade Costs of Fruits Relative to White Maize
Crop (Variety) Raw Gap Adjusted by Routes
Avocado (Hass) 1.5 1.4
Cucumber 2.4 2.0
Pepper (Poblano) 2.1 1.9
Tomato (Saladette) 1.5 1.4
Watermelon (Rayada) 1.9 2.0
Notes: Adjusted gaps take into account origin-destination fixed effects.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from INEGI-ENA 2014 and SNIIM.
controlling the distribution of cash crops was related to low prices faced by farmers.
In contrast, producers in other Latin American countries receive 50% of retail prices,
and in some cases of Central America between 65% and 75%.12
The previous paragraphs focused on trade costs of output in agricultural markets.
However, trade costs of modern inputs are also relevant. To measure trade costs of
fertilizers, I use a similar approach though the available data is different. First, from
the ENA 2014 surveys, I obtain quantities in tons of chemicals and natural fertilizers
used for production of crops. Total expenses on fertilizers are also reported for each
crop. Then, I calculate implicit prices of fertilizers at the farm level dividing total
expenditures by total quantity of fertilizers. A wide range of varieties of chemical
fertilizers are reported by farmers, so I focus on the chemicals that account for the
majority of the observations: Urea and Ammonium Sulfate. The former is mostly
imported from Eastern Europe, while the latter is primarily produced in the central
12See OECD (2007), p. 67.
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Table 2.3: Trade Costs of Fertilizers: Farm Prices Relative to Market Price in Origin
Variety Price gap
Urea 1.62
Ammonium Sulfate 1.53
Notes: Median gap at the national level. Most of Urea is imported so the origin refers to a port (Veracruz). For
Ammonium Sulfate, origin refers to the region where production plants are located (Queretaro). See text for details.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from INEGI-ENA 2014, and SNIIM.
region of the country.13
I use data from SNIIM to get the commercial price of these fertilizers in their
possible state of origin: Veracruz (a port) for Urea and Queretaro (a production
plant) for Ammonium Sulfate. To have a higher number of observations, I estimate
trade costs for these products by aggregating farm prices to the municipality level
and dividing them by the commercial price at the state of origin. Table 2.3 presents
the median farm to market ratio. The magnitude of these gaps is consistent with the
fact that most farmers report that a main obstacle of production are the high costs
to acquire modern inputs.
This section provided evidence on the existence of large trade costs in agricultural
markets in Mexico. Intuitively, these trade costs might amplify the number of farmers
producing maize relative to fruits for the following reasons. First, farmers producing
fruits receive a lower share of their market value because trade costs are higher in
this sector. Second, when staple food is costly to trade from farms to dense urban
regions, more labor needs to be allocated to its production to guarantee that demand
13Source: 2006 report from ANACOFER, a national association of production and distribution of
fertilizers.
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is satisfied. And third, given that modern inputs are costly to acquire, more labor
needs to be allocated to produce enough staple food for the population. The following
section introduces a model to assess the quantitative importance of interregional trade
costs for crop choices and agricultural productivity in a context with subsistence
requirements of staple food.
2.3 Model
I develop a static general equilibrium model with interregional trade. The model
includes production of different agricultural goods and features heterogeneous produc-
tivity across farmers, non-homothetic preferences, and trade costs. The framework
builds on the selection model of Lagakos and Waugh (2013), the trade literature based
on Eaton and Kortum (2002), and the interregional trade model of Herrendorf et al.
(2012).
There is an urban region denoted by u and a rural region denoted by r. Regions
are indexed by j ∈ {u, r}. Each region is populated by a household of size Nj.
Individuals can move freely between regions so Nj is endogenous. There are three
sectors in the economy: a nonagricultural good (n), and two agricultural goods: one
is maize (m), a staple crop which is used for subsistence requirements, and the other
is a fruit (f) or cash crop. These goods are indexed by s ∈ {n,m, f}. I assume that
the urban region only produces non-agricultural goods, whereas the rural region only
produces agricultural goods. Interregional trade is restricted by sector-specific trade
costs.
The details of the decision process are presented below. Here, I describe the timing
of the choices in the model. First, individuals choose to live either in the urban
household or the rural household. Then, the rural household allocates its members as
farmers (farm managers) or farmworkers. Finally, farmers decide to produce either
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maize or fruits based on their individual productivity to produce each crop.
2.3.1 Preferences and Endowments
In both regions, household preferences are defined according to the utility function
U(cjm, cjf , cjn) = mlog
(
cjm −m
)
+ f log
(
cjf
)
+ nlog
(
cjn
)
(2.1)
where
∑
i i = 1, m > 0 is the subsistence requirement of maize consumption, and cjs
is consumption per capita of good s in region j.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time that is inelastically supplied
to the labor market. In the rural region, the household is endowed with L units of
land for agricultural production and decides the fraction of its members that operate
farms and the fraction of members that are workers hired by farms. Each farmer i is
endowed with the same fraction of land ` and a pair of efficiency units of land {zim, zif}
to produce crops m and f , which is drawn from a distribution G(zm, zf ). However,
a farmer can only produce one type of crop in her plot of land. The heterogeneity
in productivity across farmers can be interpreted as differences related to both the
quality of land and the managerial skills of farmers to produce each crop. I abstract
from the occupational choice between agriculture and non-agriculture by assuming
that land productivities are drawn after the rural household has allocated its members
as farmers and workers. I do this simplification to focus on the crop choice by farmers,
which is the main subject of this paper.
2.3.2 Production Technologies
The non-agricultural good is produced according to a constant returns to scale
production function using labor as the only input, Yn = ANn, where A is an economy-
wide productivity parameter and Nn is the amount of labor used in non-agriculture.
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Given prices, the representative firm in region u maximizes profits by solving
max
Nun
PunANn −WuNn, (2.2)
where Pun and Wu are the price of the non-agricultural good and the wage per unit
of labor in region u, respectively.
Farmers operating in the rural region use their fraction of land to produce agri-
cultural goods in sector s ∈ {m, f}, according to the production function yis =
A (zis `)
αs(nis)
βs(xij)
ψs , where nis and x
i
s are hired labor and nonagricultural inter-
mediate inputs, respectively, used by farmer i to produce crop s. I allow factor shares
to be potentially different across agricultural goods and assume αs + βs + ψs = 1.
Since land is fixed for each farmer, there are decreasing returns at the farm level.
Given the choice to produce crop s, taking prices as given, a farmer maximizes
profits by solving
max
{nis,xis}s∈{m,f}
Prs y
i
s − Prnxis −Wr nis, (2.3)
where Prs is the price of good s in region r and Wr is the labor wage in region r.
Then, the payment received by each farmer is defined as piis = αsPrs y
i
s. The latter
are residual earnings of a farm after input payments are made.
Interregional Trade
Goods can be traded between regions subject to iceberg costs. Region j must
ship τ jks units of good s in order for one unit to arrive in region k. Thus, τ
jk
s = 1
implies frictionless trade and τ jks → ∞ implies autarky. By construction, the rural
region sends crops to the urban region and the latter sends non-agricultural goods to
the rural region, so I omit the superscripts. Then, relative prices between regions are
given by
Prn
Pun
= τn, and
Prs
Pus
=
1
τs
, s ∈ {m, f}. (2.4)
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Trade costs generate a wedge between prices across regions. In particular, trade
costs increase the price of crops in the urban region and the price of intermediate
inputs in the rural region. These trade technologies imply that interregional exports
and imports, Es and Ms, respectively, must satisfy the following restrictions
Es = τsMs, s ∈ {n,m, f}. (2.5)
That is, trade costs increase the amount of goods that must be shipped to satisfy a
given amount of demand in the destination region.14
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Farmers in the rural region choose to produce crop m or f based on their com-
parative advantage. In a competitive equilibrium, a farmer decides to produce maize
if and only if her residual earnings of maize piim are higher than her residual earnings
of fruits piif , that is, if and only if
zim
zif
≥ K
(
Prf
)1/αf
(
Prm
)1/αm (Wr)
(
βm
αm
− βf
αf
) (
Prn
)(ψm
αm
−ψf
αf
)
, (2.6)
where K is a constant. Holding all else fixed, a lower relative price of fruits with
respect to maize leads to a higher share of farmers producing maize. The effects
of labor wages and the price of non-agricultural inputs on the crop choice depends
on how intensive is maize production in labor and intermediate inputs relative to
fruits production. Below, I present a simplified case to illustrate how crop choices are
affected by the key features of the model.
Additionally, households maximize utility by choosing consumption per capita of
each good subject to income per capita Ij/Nj. Then, it can be shown that optimal
14Equations in 2.4 and 2.5 can be obtained from modeling the firm’s maximization problem in a
competitive transportation sector. See Herrendorf et al. (2012).
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consumption allocations in both regions are given by
cjm =
m
Pjm
(
Ij
Nj
− Pjmm
)
+m,
cjf =
f
Pjf
(
Ij
Nj
− Pjmm
)
,
cjn =
n
Pjn
(
Ij
Nj
− Pjmm
)
.
(2.7)
Non-homothetic preferences imply that the expenditure share of maize decreases with
income, while the expenditure share of fruits and non-agricultural goods increases.
These preferences are consistent with the patterns observed for budget shares of
cereals and non-food products as income increases, and account for the fact that
subsistence production is mostly observed for staple grains.15 Household income in
the urban region is given by labor payments, while income in the rural region is given
by labor payments plus farmers earnings, that is,
Iu = WuNu,
Ir = WrNrw +
(
Nr −Nrw
)( ∑
s∈{m,f}
∫
i∈Ωs
piisdGi
)
,
(2.8)
where Nrw is the fraction of household members that are farmworkers in the rural
region and Ωs represents the set of farmers producing crop s.
To define a competitive equilibrium, I assume the non-agricultural good is the
numeraire and normalize Pun = 1. Then, market clearing conditions for goods are
given by
Nucun + En = Yn, (2.9)
15See Appendix E for evidence on subsistence production of different crops.
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Nucuf = Mf , (2.10)
Nucum = Mm, (2.11)
Nrcrn +Xrm +Xrf = Mn, (2.12)
Nrcrf + Ef = Yf , (2.13)
Nrcrm + Em = Ym. (2.14)
According to equations (9)-(11), total production of non-agricultural goods in
the urban region is equal to local consumption by the household plus exports to
the rural region, and urban consumption of crops is met by imports from the rural
region. Equations (12)-(14) say that local consumption of non-agricultural goods
in the rural region plus total intermediate inputs used by farmers, where Xrs =
(Nr −Nrw)
∫
i∈Ωs x
i
sdGi, s ∈ {m, f}, are equal to imports from the urban region, and
total production of crops, Ys = (Nr − Nrw)
∫
i∈Ωs y
i
sdGi, s ∈ {m, f}, is equal to local
consumption plus exports to the urban region.
Free movement of individuals across regions implies that household utilities are
equalized. In addition, individuals living in the rural region are indifferent between
operating as farmers and working as hired labor in farms. Therefore, labor wage in
the rural region must be equal to expected earnings of farmers,
Wr =
∑
s∈{m,f}
∫
i∈Ωs
piisdGi. (2.15)
Market clearing of labor market in the rural region requires that total labor demand
equals the total number of farmworkers, Nrw = Nrm + Nrf , where Nrs = (NR −
Nrw)
∫
i∈Ωs n
i
sdGi. Note that in this model total labor in agriculture is equal to hired
labor plus farm operators. That is, total labor allocated to crop s is given by Nrs =
Nrs + Φs, where Φs is number of farmers producing crop s. The latter is consistent
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with the way in which total labor in crop production is calculated for the empirical
evidence in Section 2.2.1.16 Finally, the fraction of land that every farmer receives
satisfies
∑
s∈{m,f}Φs ` = L.
A competitive equilibrium with interregional trade is a set of prices of goods and in-
puts {Pjn, Pjm, Pjf ,Wj}, j ∈ {u, r}; location choices (Nj individuals choose region j);
farmers’ earnings, piis, s ∈ {m, f}; sets of households’ allocations, {Cjm, Cjf , Cjn}, j ∈
{u, r}, and {Φm,Φf , Nrw}; a set of input choices in each region, {Nun, Nrm, Nrf , Xrm, Xrf};
and a set of interregional trade flows, {Ef , Em, En,Mf ,Mm,Mn}, such that: (i) given
prices and farmers earnings, households maximize utility in both regions; (ii) given
prices, firms and farmers maximize profits; and (iii) market clearing conditions hold.
2.3.4 Productivities Distribution
I follow the parametrization of Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and define the joint
distribution of crop-specific individual productivities as
Gj(zm, zf ) = C[F (zm), F (zf )], C[u, v] = −1
ρ
log
(
1 +
(
e−ρu − 1)(e−ρv − 1)
e−ρ − 1
)
.
(2.16)
C[F (zm), F (zf )] is a Frank copula with parameter ρ ∈ {−∞,∞}\{0}. The latter
governs the correlation between productivity draws, such that a positive value of ρ
implies a positive dependence between zm and zf . The marginal distributions are
Fre´chet
F (zs) = exp
(− z−θss ),
where θs governs the dispersion of productivity draws and the scale parameter is
normalized to one. There is a negative relationship between the value of θs and the
16According to Mexican national account data from 2008, non-hired labor(e.g. owners, family
members and unpaid workers) account for 63% of total labor in agriculture.
78
variation of land augmenting productivity in crop s ∈ {m, f}; that is, a lower θs
implies a higher variation in individual productivity. The dependence across produc-
tivity draws ρ and the variation of individual productivity θs determine the extent
of alignment between absolute advantage and comparative advantage in a particular
sector, that is, the difference in productivity between the marginal farmer and average
farmer in a sector.17 The quantitative section provides more details on the role of
these parameters in the model.
2.3.5 Trade Costs and Crop Choice
Farmers select into crops as an efficient response to subsistence requirements of
staple food and trade costs. To see how the model works, assume that αm = αf ,
γm = γf , and ψm = ψf ; and m → 0 (maize consumption is equal to the subsistence
level). Then, the cutoff that determines the crop choice of farmers is given by
zim
zif
≥
(
Prf
Prm
)1/α
=
[(
mf
Cuf
)
τm
τf
(
Iu/Nu
Pumm
− 1
)]1/α
. (2.17)
In a world without trade costs, farmers would take prices of the urban market as given
and decide which crop to produce based on the relative price; however, the existence
of trade costs creates a wedge across regional prices and changes the relative price
between crops in the rural region. Particularly, if trade costs of fruits are higher, then
the relative price of fruits with respect to maize is lower and more farmers decide
to produce maize. As shown in Section 2.2.2, trade costs of fruits are significantly
higher than trade costs of maize in Mexico. Thus, trade costs amplify the selection
into staple crops by reducing the relative price of fruits.
Moreover, subsistence requirements raise the share of farmers producing maize by
17See Young (2014) for a similar discussion applied to goods and services.
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increasing the relative price of this crop. To see the interaction between trade costs
and subsistence requirements in the model, note that when trade costs decrease in the
economy, there is a positive “income effect” that leads to an increase in the demand
for non-agricultural goods and fruits that is higher than the increase in the demand
for maize. The latter is due to the presence of non-homothetic preferences in the
model. This implies that an economy with lower trade costs has a relatively lower
demand for maize and, therefore, a smaller share of farmers producing this crop.
Finally, trade costs can be considered a barrier that affects the allocation of labor
across sectors, especially across types of crops. However, this is not a source of
misallocation in the model as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009); to the contrary, farming
decisions are efficient given the subsistence needs for staple food and the level of trade
costs in each sector. The potential welfare and productivity gains from generating
a movement of farmers from maize to fruit production come from the fact that a
high concentration of farmers in maize implies that many of them have a relative low
productivity in that sector. In other words, farmers who have a higher productivity
draw for fruit production might decide to produce maize because the relative price of
this crop is high.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the model to match features of the Mexican economy.
Then, I introduce changes to the baseline economy to evaluate the quantitative role of
trade costs in allocating farmers across types of crops and generating low agricultural
labor productivity. Specifically, I quantify the effects of assuming no trade costs across
regions. However, while the latter case is helpful to analyze the overall importance of
trade costs, it does not represent a plausible scenario for policy implications; therefore,
I also consider the counterfactual case of an overall decrease in trade costs to the U.S.
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level. Finally, to consider the general implications for poorer countries than Mexico,
I recalibrate specific parameters of the model to match features of a typical African
country and evaluate the effects of reducing trade costs.
2.4.1 Calibration
For the baseline case, I normalize the economy-wide productivity parameter by
setting A = 1. The remaining parameters that need to be calibrated are preferences
weights s, s ∈ {m, f, n}; the subsistence requirement of stable food m; trade costs τs;
productivity distribution parameters θs and ρ; and factor income shares {αs, γs, ψs}. I
calibrate the economy so that the urban region in the model represents the main cities
where large wholesale markets of agricultural products are located in every state, and
the rural region represents all locations with farming production according to ENA
2014 surveys. To compare staples and cash crops, I focus on maize and the most
important exported fruits in Mexico: avocados, chili peppers, cucumber, watermelon,
melon, papaya, and tomatoes.18
Trade costs. The estimation of trade costs is based on the idea of comparing
otherwise homogeneous products across origins and destinations in Mexico. Donald-
son (2018) uses this principle to estimate trade costs in India by comparing prices
of regional varieties of salt. In this case, I compare prices of specific varieties of
crops and chemical fertilizers. The assumption is that a crop variety is essentially
the same good when it is sold by a farmer in a given state than when it is bought
by a consumer in a wholesale market in another state. For example, in the case of
fruits, if they did not spoil during transportation and are eatable by consumers, they
are essentially the same good in the farm and the marketplace. Similarly, a specific
18These crops alone account for approximately 50% of the total value of agricultural exports in
the last decade (not including livestock and fishery products).
81
type of fertilizer, such as Urea or Ammonium Sulfate, is an homogeneous chemical
compound regardless of the point of sale.
Trade costs of fruits τf are estimated by comparing farm-gate prices and market
prices of crops varieties between each point of origin and destination, as in equation 2.4
of the model. The origin price refers to the average farm-gate price in each state
obtained from ENA 2014 surveys and the destination price is the wholesale price in
every state where it is sold. This procedure is described in Section 2.2.2. I focus
on a subset of fruits varieties that are produced and/or sold in many states. These
crops include avocado (hass), tomato (bola and saladette), watermelon (cambray),
cucumber, papaya (maradol), and three varieties of chili pepper (poblano, jalapen˜o,
and serrano). I aggregate trade costs of fruits weighting each crop by their national
production value in 2014. For staple crops, I estimate the mean price gap between
origins and destination of maize (white). The results of this estimation are τf equal
to 2.20 (45% farm share), and τm equal to 1.51 (66% farm share). These estimates
imply large differences in trade costs within agriculture, which may reflect higher
transportation and storage costs of fruits (e.g. refrigeration and spoilage), as well as
monopoly power of intermediaries. The fact is that farmers face higher trade costs
to enter fruits markets.
To estimate trade costs of non-agricultural inputs, I follow the steps described in
Section 2.2.2, which imply comparing prices of fertilizers faced by farmers with market
prices in the place of origin. I focus on those cases where the chemical fertilizer used
is Urea, which is the most common fertilizer reported in the surveys. Given that most
of this fertilizer is imported, I estimate the price gap between farms and the market
price in Veracruz, one of the main ports where this product enters the country.19
19Other important port is Manzanillo in the state of Colima, but market prices of Urea in this
state are practically the same as in Veracruz.
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The median price gap implies that τn is equal to 1.62, which is consistent with the
fact that most farmers surveyed report high inputs costs as their main production
obstacle.20
Jointly calibrated parameters. I jointly calibrate the subsistence parameter m and
productivity distribution parameters θm, θf and ρ to match four moments: total
employment in maize relative to cash crops, 3.43; the variance of log yields measured
as output value per hectare in each agricultural sector, 3.01 for fruits and 2.05 for
maize; and the ratio of average output value per hectare in fruits to maize, 3.77. The
value of these moments is estimated using data from ENA 14 surveys.
The reasoning behind the joint calibration is the following. First, there is a posi-
tive relationship between the size of subsistence requirements of staple food and the
share of total workers (farmers plus hired labor) producing in that sector. Secondly,
the variation in output value per hectare in each sector is governed by parameters θm
and θf . To see this, note that in the model output value per hectare for each farmer
in sector s is given by the following expression: Prsy
i
s = z
i
s
(
Prs
) 1
αs
(
βs
Wr
) βs
αs
(
ψs
Prn
)ψs
αs
;
therefore, var(log(Prs y
i
s)) = var(log(z
i
s)). By matching the conditional variance of
yields in the model with the variation observed in data, it is possible to discipline
the parameters the govern the unconditional distribution in each agricultural sector.
Finally, as described by Lagakos and Waugh (2013), the correlation parameter ρ gov-
erns the yield gap across types of crops by determining how strong is the relationship
between absolute and comparative advantage. The results presented in Table 2.4 im-
ply that variation in fruits productivity is higher than in maize (θf < θm), which may
reflect the fact that there is a wider variety of goods in the fruit sector, each of which
requires particular farmer skills and land qualities to grow effectively. The positive
20I use the median gap because the distribution of relative prices of fertilizers has a long right tail
and do not want to overestimate the size of trade costs for non-agricultural inputs.
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value of ρ implies a Kendall rank correlation coefficient of 0.36; thus, the calibration
implies a moderate positive correlation between productivity draws.
To illustrate the results described in the last paragraph, Figure 2.5 presents the
probability distribution of individual productivity draws implied by the baseline cal-
ibration. This figure shows that the equilibrium cutoff has to be quite large to gener-
ate the difference in labor allocation between maize and fruits. Moreover, only those
farmers with very high productivity in fruits decide to produce in that sector and,
because there is a positive correlation between productivity draws, they tend to be
the farmers with a high productivity in both crops. That is, the calibration implies
that the large productivity differences across types of crops is due to the fact that
the farmers with the best land (and managerial farm skills) tend to select into fruits
farming.
Preferences weights. Preferences weights govern expenditures shares as income
tends to infinity and non-homothetic parameters become irrelevant. I follow the
calibration strategy of Gollin and Rogerson (2014) and Tombe (2015), and use data
from the 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP) to get budget shares for
aggregates and food categories. I set these parameters to match the budget share for
food, tobacco and beverages in rich countries, 0.20, and the budget share for cereals
relative to fruits and vegetables in the same group of countries, 0.88. The latter
implies that m = 0.09 and f = 0.11.
21
Technology parameters. Factor income shares are calibrated using data from Mex-
ico Input-Output tables in 2008. To estimate factor shares of maize in the model,
I consider data of grains, legumes and oilseeds farming, while factor shares of fruits
in the model are estimated using data of fruits, nuts and vegetables farming. Pay-
21To put these numbers in context, low-income countries spend 49% of their budget on food, and
the share for cereals is 1.29 times greater than the share for fruits and vegetables.
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Figure 2.5: Baseline Probability Distribution
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Notes: This figure is obtained by simulating the probability distribution of land augmenting productivities
G(zm, zf ) implied by the internal calibration of the model.
ments to labor are calculated adjusting compensation to employees following Gollin
(2002), that is, I impute the employee compensation of non-hired labor (owners, fam-
ily, contract labor, and non-remunerated labor). For each sector, I calculate average
employee compensation and multiply it by total workers (hired and non-hired). The
share of non-agricultural intermediate inputs is computed using expenditures on in-
puts from non-agricultural sectors. Finally, I assume that payments to land include
farm profits, so these payments are estimated as gross operating surplus minus the
compensation of non-hired labor. The latter adjustment is made so gross value added
in the industry remains unchanged. Results are reported in Table 2.4. According
to these estimates, grains production is more intensive in labor than fruits. This is
in line with labor-intensive techniques used in developing countries for subsistence
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Table 2.4: Calibration Summary
Parameter Value Target
m 0.09 Budget share for food, beverages and tobacco in rich countries
f 0.11 Budget share for cereals relative to fruits in rich countries
βm 0.35 Income share of labor in grains and oilseeds
ψm 0.16 Income share of non-agricultural inputs in grains and oilseeds
βf 0.26 Income share of labor in fruits and vegetables
ψf 0.15 Income share of non-agricultural inputs in fruits and vegetables
τn 1.62 Intraregional trade costs of fertilizers
τm 1.51 Intraregional trade costs of maize
τf 2.20 Intraregional trade costs of fruits
m 0.20 Labor in maize relative to fruits
θm 0.92 Variance of maize log yields across municipalities
θf 0.80 Variance of fruits log yields across municipalities
ρ 3.67 Ratio of average output value per hectare in fruits to maize
agriculture.
Lastly, I validate the model by looking at other quantitative implications. Ta-
ble 2.5 compares the baseline results with non-targeted moments in the data. The
model is able to replicate a similar share of agricultural employment to the one ob-
served in the data. Moreover, the model does remarkably well in matching labor
productivity differences across types of crops. The calibration targeted differences
in employment and average output value per hectare, so there is no reason for the
aggregate gap in value added per worker to be exactly the same in the model and the
data. Additionally, the baseline economy generates higher labor and land produc-
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Table 2.5: Quantitative Implications
Non-targeted Moment Model Data
Agriculture employment share (%) 17.50 14.00
Ratio of value added per worker in maize to fruits 0.41 0.41
Ratio of value added per hectare in maize to fruits 0.26 0.10
Notes: Aggregate productivity gaps are reported. Labor productivity is measured using total Value Added divided
by total labor (hired labor plus farmers) in each sector.
tivity in fruits than in maize farming. The latter is especially important since these
productivity gaps are the main empirical motivation of the paper.
A model without heterogeneous farmers could not replicate these results since
differences in productivity across agricultural sectors would only reflect differences
in the income shares of inputs. In such case, the productivity gaps could only be
generated if maize production is significantly more intensive in both land and labor
compared to fruits, or if explicit barriers or wedges are introduced to prevent the
equalization of marginal products across sectors.
2.4.2 Quantitative Experiments
In this section I carry out multiple counterfactual experiments. First, I assess
the impact of assuming that there is no trade costs across regions, that is, τs =
1, for every sector. This case is useful to analyze the overall importance of trade
costs. Nevertheless, since the latter is not a plausible scenario for policy implications,
I consider a benchmark that is consistent with equivalent trade costs in the U.S..
Lastly, I evaluate the general implications for poor countries by recalibrating specific
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parameters of the model to match features of a typical African country.
To assess the quantitative importance of these experiments, I focus on the al-
location of labor and land across crops, agricultural value added per worker, and
total welfare gains. I also quantify the effects on the amount of modern inputs per
worker used in agricultural production. For each variable, I compute changes as
xˆ = x′/x, where x and x′ denote the baseline and counterfactual case, respectively.
Welfare gains are measured by obtaining the amount of income that would make the
household of each region indifferent between the baseline case and the counterfactual
economy, and calculating the average (population-weighted) of both regions. Finally,
I use a Fisher price index in the rural region to compare agricultural value added in
the baseline economy and the counterfactual cases.
The results from assuming zero trade costs across regions are presented in Ta-
ble 2.6. Agricultural labor productivity increases by 21%, the ratio of total employ-
ment in maize to fruits decreases by 19%, and there is similar reallocation of land
across crops (which is equivalent to a reallocation of farmers in the model). These re-
sults imply that the eliminating trade costs leads to an improved allocation of farmers
across types of crops based on comparative advantage. Additionally, the use of inter-
mediate inputs relative to labor increases by nearly 30%, which has a positive effect
on agricultural labor productivity. It is worth mentioning that the population share
in agriculture stays almost constant (increases by nearly 2 percentage points). One
one hand, more people can move to the city because food is less costly to transport
and more intermediate inputs are used in agriculture. On the other hand, enough
labor needs to work in fruits farming to satisfy the relatively higher demand (income
effect) and individuals do not need to live in the city to consume non-agricultural
goods at a lower price. These two effects practically offset each other.
Next, I present more conservative results based on taking the U.S. as a low trade
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Table 2.6: Counterfactual: Zero Trade Costs
Changes, relative to baseline (ratio) No Trade Costs
(τ = 1)
Agricultural Value Added per Worker 1.21
Maize to Fruits Labor Ratio 0.81
Maize to Fruits Land Ratio 0.79
Intermediates to Labor Ratio (Agriculture) 1.29
Total Welfare 1.21
Notes: Cobb-Douglas technologies imply that changes in intermediates to labor ratio are the same for both crops.
costs benchmark. Price comparisons across regions in Mexico were based on farm-
gate prices and prices in wholesale markets. To make the equivalent calculation
for the U.S., I compare the farm share of total retail costs in fruits markets with
the accumulated cost share of farms, transportation, and wholesale trade using data
from the USDA in 2007.22 The latter implies a farm-price share of 65%, which means
that trade costs of fruits in the U.S. are around 55% lower than Mexico.23 Using
this benchmark, I reduce all trade costs by the same proportion. The idea of this
experiment would be an improvement in the quality of transportation and storage
facilities in Mexico, or the adoption of policies inducing competition in transportation
markets, that would reduce trade costs to the U.S. level. I focus on fruits due to data
availability, however, these goods are the most sensitive to transportation costs.
22Data from www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-dollar-series/food-dollar-application.aspx
23A farm share of 65% implies that τf (US)=1.54. Then, the ratio of trade costs in the U.S. to
Mexico can be calculated as (1− τf (US))
/
(1− τf (MX))=0.45.
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Table 2.7: Counterfactual: U.S. Benchmark
Changes, relative to baseline (ratio) U.S. benchmark
(55% reduction in trade costs)
Agricultural Value Added per Worker 1.14
Maize to Fruits Labor Ratio 0.83
Maize to Fruits Land Ratio 0.81
Intermediates to Labor Ratio (Agriculture) 1.19
Total Welfare 1.14
Notes: Cobb-Douglas technologies imply that changes in intermediates to labor ratio are the same for both crops.
The magnitude of the results presented in Table 2.7 are large. Agricultural labor
productivity increases by 14% and the ratio of employment in maize to fruits de-
creases by 17%; furthermore, the lower costs of modern inputs increase the intensity
with which they are used in the production of agricultural goods by 19%. Therefore,
reducing trade costs to the U.S. level would raise agricultural labor productivity in
Mexico by allocating more farmers in high-productivity cash crops and increasing
the relative amount of modern inputs used in agricultural production. The size of
the productivity gains are low compare to the large agricultural productivity gaps in
Gollin et al. (014a); however, these results are in line with other papers looking at
the effects of transportation improvements on agricultural productivity. For exam-
ple, Sotelo (2018) finds an increase of 16% in average agricultural productivity from
paving roads in Peru, and Donaldson (2018) finds that railroad access increased real
agricultural income by 16% in colonial India.
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Figure 2.6: Productivity Gains from Reducing Trade Costs
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Notes: Agricultural labor productivity refers to value added per worker in agriculture relative to baseline economy.
Fruits trade costs are reduced holding trade costs in other sectors constant. Agriculture trade costs refers to both
maize and fruits.
To complement the previous experiments, Figure 2.6 shows the relationship be-
tween reductions in trade costs and agricultural labor productivity. In addition to
decreasing trade costs in every sector, I reduce trade costs in each sector indepen-
dently. These results suggest that meaningful improvements in transportation costs
are needed in order to obtain significant gains in agricultural labor productivity. The
latter provides support to the large amounts of resources that developing countries
and international organizations allocate to improve transport infrastructure. More-
over, the results show that reducing trade costs of crops has a relatively large effect
on agricultural productivity; whereas reducing trade costs of modern inputs, keeping
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Table 2.8: Welfare Gains Decomposition: Zero Trade Costs (τs = 1)
Lower spoilage General equilibrium
Aggregate welfare gains (%) 55.34 44.66
Notes: The welfare gains from lower spoilage are calculated by assuming that all spoilage gains are consumed by the
destination region in each sector, keeping all choices fixed. Then, the difference between these and the total gains is
defined as the general equilibrium gains.
trade costs of crops constant, has a relatively small effect on agricultural productivity.
The quantitative results imply that there are large welfare gains from eliminating
trade costs in the economy. Given that the transportation technology is modeled
as an iceberg cost, it is important to distinguish how much of the welfare gains in
the model are due to the lower spoilage that results from decreasing these costs and
how much is due to general equilibrium effects. To measure the former, I keep every
decision of the baseline economy fixed and increase consumption of agricultural and
non-agricultural goods in the urban and rural regions by the change in imports when
trade costs decrease. That is, I assume that households consume the extra amount
of goods that they receive without altering their baseline decisions. The general
equilibrium gains are then the total welfare gains minus the welfare gains from lower
spoilage in the economy. The decomposition from a counterfactual with zero trade
costs is presented in Table 2.8. The general equilibrium gains are large and represent
almost half of the total gains. Thus, the gains from reducing trade costs are not
only due to the lower spoilage of goods, but to the fact that agents optimally react
to trade improvements by reallocating resources across sectors, in particular, across
crops within agriculture.
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To summarize, reducing trade costs would have a large positive impact on ag-
gregate welfare and agricultural labor productivity in Mexico. The counterfactual
results imply that trade costs can account for a large share of the labor allocation
across types of crops in this country. Having said that, the motivation of this paper
was also based on the fact that many poor countries allocate most of their land to
low-productive staple crops, even if yields in many fruits are significantly higher (see
Figure 2.1).
To analyze the quantitative implications of the model for poorer countries than
Mexico, I recalibrate the baseline economy to match features of the economy in
Uganda. In particular, I calibrate the economy-wide productivity parameter and
the trade costs to match the share of employment in agriculture and the price gap
of fruits across distant regions in that country. The idea is to change the baseline
economy in order to get a higher share of employment in agriculture, as in a typical
poor country, and be consistent with the low quality of transportation infrastructure.
According to United Nations data from 2014, agriculture accounted for 72% of em-
ployment in Uganda. Then, I decrease A to make the modeled economy poor enough
so that more people work in agriculture. The latter is a result of non-homothetic
preferences in the model. Additionally, Gollin and Rogerson (2010) compute the dif-
ference between the wholesale price of Matoke (a variety of banana) at the region of
origin and the wholesale price at distant points of sale. The highest ratio of desti-
nation to origin price is 4.17, with a distance between points of approximately 500
kilometers (311 miles). While I am taking the highest price ratio according to the
data used by those authors, it represents the costs from transporting fruits from the
southwest region of Uganda to the North region of the country and, thus, it reflects
the quality of transport infrastructure across the country. Similarly to the experi-
ment based on the U.S., I use this number to increase all trade costs in the economy
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Table 2.9: Counterfactual: Case of Uganda
Variable Change (%)
Urban population share 56.6
Slum population (urban share) -34.5
Total Output 10.3
Welfare 2.6
proportionally.
Once the baseline economy has been calibrated to match the facts described in the
previous paragraph, I reduce trade costs to the U.S. level and quantify the effects as
was done for the case of Mexico. In this case, trade costs in Uganda are reduced 83%
to reach the U.S. level.24 The results presented in Table 2.9 show that the effects are
much larger for a poor country like Uganda. Agricultural labor productivity increases
by 191%, the ratio of employment in maize to fruits decreases by more than 70%, and
the use of intermediates relative to labor increases by factor of 4.7. The latter reflects
the lower cost of modern inputs and the big movement of population from the rural
region to the city. These results imply that reducing trade costs in extremely poor
countries can increase agricultural labor productivity by releasing individuals from
this sector and allocating a larger share of agricultural labor to high-productivity
crops.25
24The magnitude of the difference in trade costs between Uganda and the U.S. is consistent with
the findings of Adamopoulos (2011) for differences in transportation costs between rich and poor
countries.
25The fact that gains from trade are especially high for poor countries is a common result in the
trade literature. For example, see the results in Adamopoulos (2011) and Tombe (2015) for rich and
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2.5 Conclusions
This paper documents evidence that labor productivity in agriculture is much
lower for staple crops than for cash crops. I use microdata from Mexican farms to
show that many fruits have a higher labor productivity than maize, yet, the share of
employment in the latter is significantly larger. These findings imply that the agri-
cultural productivity puzzle is actually a staple productivity puzzle and focusing on
production decisions of farmers is key to understand why agricultural labor produc-
tivity is so low in poor countries. One explanation proposed in this paper is that a
high share of farmers decides to produce staple crops due to subsistence requirements
of staple food and the existence of interregional trade costs in agricultural markets;
in particular, the fact that trade costs are larger for cash crops amplifies the selection
of farmers into staple crops.
The quantitative experiments imply that trade costs can account for low agricul-
tural productivity and a large share of labor allocations across crops. The ratio of
employment in maize to fruits in Mexico would be 17% lower if trade costs were at the
U.S. level, and agricultural labor productivity would be 14% higher. These results im-
ply that removing trade barriers in crops markets and reducing costs of modern inputs
have the potential to boost economic development in rural areas where agriculture is
the predominant activity.
There are alternative and complementary explanations to the one proposed in this
paper. For example, switching from staple to cash crops might require large initial
investments such as buying a fruit tree or acquiring modern seeds to grow attractive
commercial crops; thus, barriers preventing access to capital and input markets may
keep too many farmers out of the cash crops sector. Also, farmers need to have
poor countries.
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accurate and updated information on crops prices in order to make the best farming
decision; thus, barriers to the flow of information might be key to explain the fact
that many farmers decide to grow maize, in spite of the large productivity differences.
These and other possible explanations are subject of future research.
The results of this paper have important policy implications. First, reducing stor-
age and transportation costs of crops can have large positive results on agricultural
labor productivity, especially in poor countries that lack proper infrastructure for
intraregional trade. Second, policies should focus on guaranteeing competitive con-
ditions along the supply chain in agricultural markets. Reducing transaction costs
and establishing competitive markets seems crucial to allow small and medium scale
farmers to enter and grow in profitable agricultural markets.
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APPENDIX A
URBAN DIVISION IN MUMBAI
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The following map shows the classification of Mumbai sub-districts into urban
center or periphery used in the calibration of the model described in Section 1.5.1.
The periphery are those sub-districts which are located 20 or more kilometers away
from the closest CBD. The distances were obtained using Google Maps. Bandra Kurla
Complex is the main CBD of the city today. Previously, it was Nariman Point, which
is located in the south of the city.
Figure A.1: Mumbai Sub-districts (Wards) Division
Main CBD
CBD
Periphery
Center
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APPENDIX B
DATA AND EMPIRICAL DETAILS
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This section provides more details of the empirical evidence presented in Sec-
tion 2.2. Using data from the ENA 14 surveys, the steps to calculate value added for
each crop that is produced in a farm are the following. First, to obtain the value of
output I multiply the volume of harvested output by the farm-gate price reported by
the farmer. Many farmers do not report a price because they did not sell any output
in that period of time, especially those who produce maize; for such cases, I use the
average price of the crop in the municipality where the farm is located or, in cases
where there is no data to compute the latter, the average price of the crop in the
state. I eliminate outliers (0.5% of each tail) to compute those average prices. The
next step is obtaining the value of intermediate inputs used in the production of each
crop. Different categories of farm expenses are reported at the crop level; however,
some categories like soil preparation and sowing may include payments to capital and
labor. Therefore, I only consider expenditures on modern inputs that do not include
any payments to factors of production: fertilizers; chemicals and pesticides; and irri-
gation. Finally, I subtract the value of production that is used for seed and feed in
the farm from the value of total output.
To estimate value added per hectare, I take the amount of harvested hectares
reported by the farmer for each crop. Estimating value added per worker involves
additional steps. The number of workers (owner, family members and hired labor)
are reported at the farm level and, thus, they might be used in the production of
more than one crop within a farm. Then, I focus on farms that only produce one
type of crop, otherwise there is not an obvious way to allocate labor to different crops
produced in a farm. To define farms producing a single crop, I aggregate the different
varieties of the crops considered in Section 2.2.2 into one category; for example, all
varieties of chili pepper are considered as one type of crop. Under such considerations,
from the total number of farms producing maize, fruits or both, only 5.8% of them
produces maize and one of the fruits. Thus, by focusing on farms that produce one
type of crop I only lose a small share of farms.1 However, the farms omitted from the
estimation of labor productivity might grow any number of different crops varieties
and that is reflected in the difference of farm-crop observations between land and
labor productivity gaps reported in Table 2.1.
I now describe the farm price data used in the estimation of trade costs. For crops,
I use prices reported by farmers and compute the average price at the state level after
eliminating outliers (0.5% of each tail). In the case of fertilizers, farmers do not report
the actual price they paid, instead they report total quantities of both natural and
chemical fertilizers used for crop production, as well as total expenses on fertilizers.
Since I cannot split the latter between natural and chemical fertilizers, I compute the
fertilizer price as total expenditure divided by total quantity. This procedure results
in a distribution of fertilizers prices with fat tails. From observation and comparison
with public market prices, I eliminate outliers to compute average prices at the state
and municipality level (2.5% of each tail). In Section 2.2.2 of the main text, I focus
on cases where the chemical fertilizer used by the farmer was Urea or Ammonium
Sulfate, which account for 45% of the observations that reported fertilizers.
As described in the main text, the second most important data source used for
the empirical evidence comes from the SNIIM. This is a government website that
provides information of market prices in primary sectors of the economy. I build a
1In general, the surveyed farms produce less than two (1.7) different varieties of crops on average.
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dataset with the monthly price of varieties of fruits and grains in the main wholesale
markets of the country (usually located in the capital of a state). For each crop in
a particular market, both the price (per kilogram most of the times) and state of
origin are reported. It is worth mentioning that downloading and processing these
data requires a non-trivial amount of time in order to produce a database of market
prices of crop varieties in every state. Additionally, SNIIM provides data on market
prices of fertilizers throughout the country. I use this to obtain the price of Urea and
Ammonium Sulfate in the possible state of origin, either a port or the state where a
production plant is located. These locations are obtained from a 2006 report made
by ANACOFER, a national association of production and distribution of fertilizers.
Finally, I use public data from national accounts. Particularly, I use the 2008
Input-Output matrix that has data on value added, inputs expenditures, and to-
tal employment at the six-digit industry level, including 50 types of crops. I also use
agricultural data aggregated to the state and national level from the Sistema de Infor-
macio´n Pesquera y Alimentaria (SIAP) of the Secretar´ıa de Agricultura, Ganader´ıa,
Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentacio´n (SAGARPA). These data on production,
prices, yields, and land is collected by governments offices located in many localities
throughout the country and is available from 1980 to 2014.
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APPENDIX C
REGIONAL PRODUCTION OF CROPS
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This section documents evidence that farmers in most regions of Mexico have the
possibility to produce cash crops with a higher productivity than maize. The goal is
not to determine the optimal group of crops that a particular region should grow. The
latter would depend in agro-ecological conditions of each subregion in the country.
The aim is to show that in most localities within states there exists production of
high-productivity fruits, so farmers are not always forced to grow staple crops by
conditions related to climate or quality of soil in a particular area. That is, the fact
that most labor and land is allocated to maize is a choice.
I look at the geographical distribution of production and yields, measured as
output value per hectare, within states in Mexico using data from SIAP, which is the
most comprehensive source of aggregate agricultural data. To simplify the analysis,
I focus on a particular group of crops that includes the types of fruits considered in
the main text: avocado, banana, chili pepper, cucumber, mango, papaya, tomato,
and watermelon; and on those states with a high level of poverty and large share
of agricultural employment. These states located in the central-south region are
characterized by small-scale farming. Every state is divided in municipalities that
cover multiple towns or cities. There are 2,458 municipalities in the country and 53%
are located in the six states considered.
Figure C.1 presents the distribution of yields across municipalities in 2014. I cal-
culate the average yield relative to maize weighted by harvested hectares. According
to these maps, the majority of municipalities produce fruits with yields that are more
than two times higher than those of maize. Furthermore, there are no particular sub-
regions that seem to be limited with respect to the rest. Only Chiapas and Oaxaca
have relatively big municipalities with no data, but these are surrounded by locali-
ties with presence of high productivity fruits. Thus, even if some subregions in these
states seem to have higher levels of productivity, there is no evidence to conclude that
other subregions are significantly constrained to produce alternative crops to maize.
In addition, to provide a general picture of the country, Figure C.8 presents a map
with the fraction of municipalities in each state that produce at least one cash crop
(from the group considered) with a higher yield than maize. This figure suggests that
in most states of Mexico, farmers in over 50% of municipalities produce fruits that
render a higher output value per hectare than maize. The states with the highest
geographical concentration of production are in the north.1 The main takeaway from
these facts is that in most regions of the country farmers have the possibility to
produce fruits that have a higher yield than maize. While specific subregions may be
able to attain higher yields, this does not imply that staple crops like maize are the
only feasible option in other areas.
1A possible explanation for the spatial concentration in the north is that most of this region is
arid and agro-climatic conditions are less favorable; moreover, in comparison to the south, these
states are characterized by large commercial farms.
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Figure C.1: Distribution of Relative Fruit Yields in Poor States (Maize=1)
Figure C.2: Chiapas Figure C.3: Guerrero
Figure C.4: Michoacan
Figure C.5: Oaxaca
Figure C.6: Puebla
Figure C.7: Veracruz
Note: Average yields are weighted by harvested hectares.
Source: Author’s estimates using SIAP data, 2014
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Figure C.8: Share of Municipalities with High-productivity Fruits
Source: Author’s estimates using SIAP data, 2014
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APPENDIX D
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY WITH AGGREGATE DATA
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Table D.1: Productivity Gaps and Employment Shares of Crops
Value added per worker Employment share of
Crops relative to non-agriculture total agriculture
Maize 0.15 23.1%
Other grains 0.19 15.8%
Top cash crops 0.40 8.2%
Agricultural Sector 0.16 100%
Notes: Top cash crops includes avocados, tomatoes, chili peppers, other vegetables, and other non-citrus fruits and
nuts. These crops account for 64% of total exports in agriculture and 54% of Value Added in fruits and vegetables
farming. Products are classified according to the NAICS.
Source: Author’s calculations using Input-Output Data from Mexico, 2008.
This section complements the results from Section 2.2.1 using aggregate data of
Mexican agriculture. I compute value added per worker for different industries using
Input-Output data from 2008. First, Table D.1 presents labor productivity relative
to non-agriculture for three categories of crops. Value added per worker in maize
and other grains is less than half of value added per worker in cash crops production.
Moreover, the productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture is almost the
same as the one between maize and non-agriculture. The latter implies that the large
agricultural productivity gap is actually measuring large productivity differences with
respect to unproductive staple crops that have the largest employment share.
Second, Panel A in Figure D.1 shows value added per worker relative to maize for
different categories of cash crops. These results confirm that there are large differences
in labor productivity between fruits and maize. Moreover, Panel B shows that labor
allocated to maize is much higher than any of these cash crops. Overall, these facts
are consistent with the ones presented in section 2.2.1 using farm data.
Finally, to explore if the year of the ENA 2014 surveys was important for the
empirical results, I compute log-yields of crops using state-panel data of agricultural
production and prices in Mexico from 1980 to 2012. For each state in every year, yields
are expressed in units of maize using relative prices. These yields are detrended using
a linear regression with respect to time, taking 2012 as the base year. Figure D.3
shows the non-parametric densities of crop yields. According to this data, the average
log-yield of each of these fruits is higher than the average yield of maize; in some cases,
like with tomatoes, the difference in average log-yield is around 4. These results imply
that the yield distribution of many fruits first-order stochastically dominates the yield
distribution of maize. Thus, this data suggests that 2014 was not a special year and
the productivity gaps between types of crops are persistent over time. If any, this
motivates future research to explore other possible barriers.
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Figure D.1: Panel A. Value Added per Worker Relative to Maize
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Figure D.2: Panel B. Total Workers relative to Maize
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Notes: Maize is normalized to 1 in both cases.
Source: Author’s calculations using National Accounts Data from INEGI: Input-Output Data. Mexico 2008.
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Figure D.3: Crop Yields Distributions
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Notes: Kernel densities (Epanechnikov). Log-yields are detrended using a linear regression and taking 2012 as the
base year.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from SIAP. State panel from 1980 to 2012.
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APPENDIX E
SUBSISTENCE PRODUCTION OF CROPS
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In this section I provide evidence to support the assumption in the model regarding
subsistence consumption of staple food. Staple crops like maize and rice are the
main food component of a population’s diet, especially in poor countries. A key
distinction between staple crops and cash crops is that a relatively high share of
staple crops production is used for subsistence requirements of food, while most cash
crops production is sold to richer regions, within and outside of a country.
To analyze subsistence requirements by crop, Table E.1 shows the average share
of farm production used for family consumption. I distinguish between farms of all
sizes and farms with less than 20 hectares. The results show that the share of maize
production used for subsistence is significantly higher than any other fruit. While
more than one third of production of maize is use for family consumption, the range
for other cash crops is between 2% and 12% of production. In fact, for most of these
fruits, less than 6% of the production is used for subsistence. This pattern is the same
for both groups of farms, so it is not exclusive of small-scale farming. These findings
support the assumption in the model that subsistence food requirements only apply
to staple crops.
Table E.1: Farm Production Used for Family Consumption by Crop
Farms Maize Watermelon Mango Avocado Chili Papaya Cucumber Tomato
All sizes 30.2% 6.0% 5.7% 5.4% 5.3% 3.6% 3.0% 2.0%
Less than 20 ha. 36.1% 9.6% 6.5% 6.0% 9.1% 4.8% 4.1% 2.8%
Notes: Average farm production by crop.
Source: Author’s estimates using data from INEGI: NSA 2014, Mexico.
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